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Security for Interlocutory Injunctions
Under Rule 65(c): Exceptions to the
Rule Gone Awry
by
ERIN CONNORS MORTON*
The power to impose such conditions is founded upon, and arises
from, the discretion which the court has in such cases, to grant, or
not to grant, the injunction applied for. It is a power inherent in the
court, as a court of equity, and has been exercised from time
immemorial.'
Introduction
An applicant seeking a preliminary injunction2 or temporary re-
straining order3 in the federal courts will typically be required to post
a bond as security before the injunction will issue. The portion of
Rule 65(c) requiring such security reads:
No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except
upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court
* J.D., 1995. B.A., B.B.A. Stetson University, 1987; M.B.A. Florida State Univer-
sity, 1988. I am grateful to Dean Mary Kay Kane for her guidance and the inspiration to
write about a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. I am deeply indebted to David Morton for
his unconditional and unwavering support of all my endeavors.
1. Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 438 (1881). The decision predates Federal Rule
65(c) but the objectives in requiring security are the same ones at issue under the Rule.
2. A preliminary injunction is issued to "protect the plaintiff from irreparable injury
and to preserve the court's power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the
merits." 11A CHARLEs ALAN WmGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2947, at 122 (1995).
3. A temporary restraining order (TRO) preserves the "status quo until there is an
opportunity to hold a hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction"; the TRO
may issue with or without notice to the adverse party. 11A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE,
supra note 2, § 2951, at 254. For ease of discussion, waiver of the bond under Rule 65(c)
will be discussed in the context of preliminary injunctions. The same issues involved in
waiving the bond for preliminary injunctions are raised in waiving the bond for temporary
restraining orders.
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deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be
incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrong-
fully enjoined or restrained.4
By the terms of the Rule, the amount of the bond to be posted is left
to the court's discretion. The court is to determine the damages and
costs the defendant will incur while the injunction is in place and set
the bond accordingly. Rule 65(c) was developed as a mechanism to
balance the plaintiff's ability to receive immediate provisional relief
with the defendant's protection in the event the defendant was wrong-
fully enjoined. Protection of the defendant is necessary because the
hearing is attenuated, and the defendant will necessarily have less
time to prepare for the preliminary injunction hearing. Because the
court has a greater chance of being wrong in a preliminary hearing as
opposed to a full trial on the merits, the bond serves as a source of
compensation for the defendant if the court later determines that the
defendant was wrongfully enjoined. In 1983, the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly stated that the bond is the defendant's only source of compen-
sation for damages from wrongful enjoinment.5
Over the last twenty years, courts have been faced with bond
waiver requests from indigent plaintiffs or groups challenging actions
under a federal statute, such as the National Environmental Policy
Act. The circuits have varied in their treatment of these bond waivers
for injunctions sought in "the public interest." The circuits have also
had trouble establishing guidelines for the district courts to follow in
deciding when a bond waiver is appropriate, even though such waivers
leave the defendant without the compensation that the bond ensures.
Rather than treating the security requirement as mandatory and
carving out narrow exceptions for these public interest litigants, at
least two circuits have interpreted the language of Rule 65(c) as vest-
ing the trial court with unfettered discretion to waive the bond.6
Other circuits, while recognizing that the bond is mandatory and that
the court's discretion is limited to setting the amount of the bond,
have formulated narrow exceptions for which waiver is appropriate. 7
In deciding whether to waive the bond most courts balance the harm
the plaintiff may incur if the injunction is denied for inability to post
the bond against the harm to the defendant, who may ultimately be
denied compensation.
The inconsistent and wide variations in the reasoning used to sup-
port bond waivers in the various circuits have left lower courts con-
fused. The confusion has resulted in dissimilar treatment for similarly
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c) (emphasis added).
5. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum &
Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 770 n.14 (1983).
6. See infra notes 100-120 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 58-93 and accompanying text.
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situated litigants in the federal courts. The most dramatic example
consists of the widely disparate reasoning and bond amounts in sev-
eral contemporaneous Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) class-action cases in different circuits. In each of these
cases, the district courts had difficulty in balancing the harm to the
retired employee plaintiffs with the compensation necessary to protect
the defendant. Consequently, very different bond amounts were re-
quired despite the similar circumstances presented.8
This Note discusses the history and purpose of Rule 65(c), argu-
ing that the bond is mandatory and that security must be posted
before the injunction may issue. Part II analyzes the different inter-
pretations of the Rule prevailing among the circuits. Part III de-
scribes the development of various exceptions to the Rule's
requirement, i.e., the allowances made primarily for indigents and
nonprofit environmental litigants. The confusion in the lower courts
arising from inconsistent application and inappropriate extensions of
these exceptions is discussed in Part IV; an analysis of the disparate
results in the ERISA cases is presented in Part V. In conclusion Part
VI proposes the analysis that ought to be used in evaluating whether
an exception warrants waiver of the bond and suggests modifications
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to accomplish such a result.
I. Purpose of the Bond under Rule 65(c)
The security requirement for provisional injunctions, as in Rule
65(c), was originally developed to protect both the court and the de-
fendant. An early case considering the history of the bond require-
ment stated that:
Its object was ... to protect the Court as well as the Defendant from
improper applications for injunctions. If the evidence in support of
the application suppressed or misrepresented facts, the Court was
enabled not only to punish the Plaintiff but to compensate the De-
fendant.... The Court therefore required the undertaking in order
that it might be able to do justice if it had been induced to grant the
injunction by false statement or suppression. 9
8. Compare Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 1025 (D.NJ. 1993)
(bond set at $7,733,514) with Warner v. Ryobi Motor Prods. Corp., 818 F. Suppl. 907
(D.S.C. 1992) (nominal bond of $250 required) and Schalk v. Teledyne, Inc., 751 F. Supp.
1261 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (bond set at $50,000); Hinckley v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 866 F. Supp.
1034 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (bond set at $55,000); Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 857 F. Supp.
1168 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (bond of $95,000); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 845 F. Supp. 410
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (bond of $100,000).
9. Smith v. Day, 21 Ch. D. 421,424 (Ch. App. 1882) (cited in Dan B. Dobbs, Should
Security Be Required as a Pre-Condition to Provisional Injunctive Relief?, 52 N.C. L. REV.
1091, 1094 n.11 (1974); Reina Calderon, Note, Bond Requirements Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(c): An Emerging Equitable Exemption for Public Interest Litigants, 13
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Modem courts have similarly described the purposes of the bond as
protecting the defendant, the plaintiff, and the court.
A. Serves as a Fund to Compensate Defendant
A primary function of the bond is to serve as a fund to ensure
compensation to a wrongfully enjoined defendant.'0 One commenta-
tor has suggested that the bond's purpose is to compensate the de-
fendant "who has been subjected to a process of law that does not
meet the kind of standards ordinarily adopted" for a full trial on the
merits. 1 Regardless of the financial resources of the plaintiff, the de-
fendant will be limited to the amount of the bond in recouping costs
and damages incurred during the injunction. Courts have waived se-
curity when they have found the applicant for the bond to be either
highly likely to succeed on the merits12 or financially responsible. 13
However, waiver of the security leaves the defendant vulnerable. In
the absence of a security bond, the wrongfully enjoined party has no
recourse for damages incurred while wrongfully enjoined.14
The bond serves as the only remedy; even if the defendant later
wins on the merits, the defendant has recourse only against the
bond.' 5 The bond also facilitates the defendant's collection of com-
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 125, 140 n.86 (1985); Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the
Injunction Bond, 73 HARV. L. REV. 333, 333 (1959)).
10. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 210 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting
Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 804 (3d Cir. 1989)); Contin-
uum Co. v. Incepts, Inc., 873 F.2d 801,803 (5th Cir. 1989); Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade,
No. C94-4117, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1514, at *166-67 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 27, 1995); Stiefel &
Co. v. Blitz, No. 93 Civ. 6080(PNL), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4,
1994); National Kidney Patients Ass'n v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1127, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Note, Recovery for Wrongful Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c), 99 HARV. L. REV.
828 (1986) [hereinafter Recovery Note]; Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction
Bond, 73 HARV. L. REv. 333, 333 (1959); see also Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 439 (1881)
(predating Rule 65 but discussing the imposition of security to ensure that the ultimately
successful party would emerge in the same position it would have held had the interference
in question not occurred).
11. Dobbs, supra note 9, at 1094.
12. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Ref. Co., 338 F.2d 780, 782-83 (10th Cir.
1964) (waiving bond because of plaintiff's apparent ability to pay damages); Specialty
Chems. & Servs., Inc. v. Chandler, No. 1:87-CV-2338-MHS, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16090,
at *16 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 1988) (finding that plaintiff was "sufficiently solvent to pay
defendants' costs should it lose at trial").
14. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum &
Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 770 n.14 (1983) ("A party injured by the issuance of an
injunction later determined to be erroneous has no action for damages in the absence of a
bond."). Id.
15. Id. at 770 n.14; Instant Air, 882 F.2d at 804; Continuum, 873 F.2d at 803; Frank's
GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 103 n.5 (3d Cir. 1988); Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 925 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding
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pensation for wrongful enjoinment by eliminating, both the need to
pursue separate litigation to collect damages and the risk of the plain-
tiff's possible insolvency.16 As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, courts
that waive the bond requirement, and thus provide no fund with
which to compensate defendant, either "unjustly deny the defendant
compensation, or to compensate the defendant,... [defeat] the rea-
sonable expectations of the plaintiff. ' 17
B. Deters Rash Applications
Second, the bond serves to deter rash applications for interlocu-
tory orders and thus avoids wasting the court's time with flimsy appli-
cations.' 8 The bond forces the plaintiff "to consider the injury to be
inflicted on its adversary in deciding whether to press ahead"' 9 with a
possibly losing claim. The financial obligation encourages caution in
plaintiffs before applying for relief. As Justice Stevens described the
purpose of the bond in Edgar v. Mite Corporation:20
Since a preliminary injunction may be granted on a mere
probability of success on the merits, generally the moving party
must demonstrate confidence in his legal position by posting bond
in an amount sufficient to protect his adversary from loss in the
event that future proceedings prove that the injunction issued
wrongfully. The bond, in effect, is the moving party's warranty that
the law will uphold the issuance of the injunction. 2I
liability limited to terms of bond unless malicious prosecution or bad faith proved); see also
Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc. 561 F.2d 807, 813 (10th Cir. 1977) (same);
Buddy Sys. Inc. v. Exer-Genie, Inc., 545 F.2d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 1976). Contra Diginet,
Inc. v. Western Union, No. 91C 156, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7240, at *4-9 (N.D. Ill. June 1,
1994) (holding that the City of Chicago could be liable for an amount over the bond under
the theory of judicial estoppel because of the City Attorney's representations at the pre-
liminary injunction hearing that the City was solvent and "good for the damages" and that
it would be a waste of public resources" to require the City to pay fee to surety).
16. Phillips v. Chas. Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Con-
tinuum, 873 F.2d at 803).
17. Continuum, 873 F.2d at 804.
18. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 211 (3d Cir. 1990) quoting
Instant Air, 882 F2d at 804; see also Coyne-Delany Co. v. Capital Dev. Bd., 717 F.2d 385,
392 (7th Cir. 1983) (discourages the seeking of preliminary injunctions on flimsy grounds);
Dobbs, supra note 9, at 1119 (stating that "it is desirable to discourage the harassing plain-
tiff by insisting that he risk something himself").
19. National Kidney Patients Ass'n v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1127, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
("The deterrence of flimsy claims depends on this."); Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, No.
C94-4117, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1514, at *167-68 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 27, 1995); Dobbs, supra
note 9, at 1094.
20. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
21. Id. at 649 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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The bond requirement also discourages plaintiffs who would other-
wise use an injunction application as a viable but ultimately meritless
litigation tactic against the defendant.22
Arguably, the bond requirement may deprive those who cannot
afford to post security of interlocutory relief. However, the Supreme
Court, in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,2 3 upheld an
analogous security-for-expenses bond despite the fact that such a
bond requirement might "foreclose resort by most stockholders."2 4 In
Cohen, the Court upheld the validity of a state statute that required
plaintiffs who owned less than a certain amount of stock to post a
bond that would cover the corporation's anticipated expenses before
they could bring suit in a shareholder derivative action.25
Security-for-expenses statutes, like the one at issue in Cohen,
were enacted in reaction to suits brought by unscrupulous sharehold-
ers who owned less than a prescribed amount of stock.2 6 According to
a 1944 study commissioned by the New York Chamber of Commerce,
these strike suits were brought by shareholders with small holdings
solely to harass corporations and force them into substantial private
settlements.2 7 The goal of the security-for-expenses statutes was simi-
lar to that of Rule 65(c): By requiring security, the legislature in-
tended to instill "a threshold of responsibility" in those bringing suit.28
22. Dobbs, supra note 9, at 1094.
23. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
24. Id. at 552.
25. Id. at 554-55.
26. Id. at 548-49.
27. 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1835, at 148 (citing F. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT RE-
GARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944) (surveying shareholder derivative
suit activity in 1930s)). The survey also found that the bulk of the litigation was handled by
a limited number of attorneys. Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative
Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 50, 52 (1968) [hereinafter 23
Years' Experience].
28. 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 27, § 1835, at 148 (describing propo-
nents' rationale). Such legislation has not been without its critics. Three main criticisms are
outlined in 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.04 cmt. h (1994): They tend to chill meritorious
and nonmeritorious actions alike; they can be outflanked by plaintiffs pleading a federal
cause of action or urging other shareholders to join in the suit to satisfy the threshold; they
tend to discriminate unfairly between large and small shareholders. See also 23 Years'
Experience, supra note 27, at 65 (finding security-for-expenses statutes are "no longer a
significant deterrent to derivative litigation whether the suit is meritorious or not"); Note,
Security for Expenses Legislation, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 281 (1952) (supporting security-
for-expenses legislation but acknowledging that there has been "considerable controversy
over the wisdom of such statutes"). Commentators have also criticized the motives of pro-
ponents of the legislation. See, e.g., George D. Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders'
Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1947) [hereinafter Hornstein, New Aspects]
(opining that the New York legislation was "clearly designed" to insulate corporate man-
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Legislation did in fact reduce the number of suits immediately follow-
ing its passage in New York.29 At the foundation of much of the criti-
cism of security-for-expenses statutes is the argument that they
completely foreclose small shareholders' access to judicial relief. In
the case of Rule 65's security requirement, however, plaintiffs are not
completely denied relief; instead they merely are required to wait un-
til the final decision on the merits.
Arguably, when the bond is waived for indigent plaintiffs, there is
also an increased risk of frivolous suits. One court has stated that its
scrutiny of the factors necessary for the issuance of a preliminary in-
junction adequately protects the government body being sued,30 while
a second court simply stated that the plaintiffs were unable to afford
the bond, and thus it should be waived.31
TWo distinctions from shareholder derivative suits may be made
in cases involving indigent litigants. First, the shareholder derivative
suit involves, by its nature, a commercial transaction. Suits involving
indigent plaintiffs in which the bond has been waived generally are
not commercia 32 and usually challenge the denial of public benefits.
A second and more important distinction from the plaintiff in a share-
holder derivative suit is that the indigent plaintiff is most likely chal-
lenging administrative action under a social welfare statute.33 One
authority, and at least one court, has suggested that proceeding under
an in forma pauperis statute may override the bond requirement in
certain circumstances. 34
The line of environmental cases is less straightforward. Courts
have held that requirement of a bond under a strict reading of Rule
65(c) would effectively deny judicial review of administrative deci-
sions to public interest groups suing under NEPA.35 Again, courts are
agement and noting the significant drop-off in shareholder derivative suits after it was en-
acted); George D. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New
York, 32 CAL. L. REV. 123 (1944) (tracing legislation's enactment and criticizing the report
on which it was based).
29. In the two and a half years after the law's enactment, only four stockholders' suits
involving widely-held corporations were brought in the Supreme Court in New York
County. The annual average was fifty in the preceding decade. Hornstein, New Aspects,
supra note 28, at 5. Hornstein argues that the legislation was passed to insulate corporate
management by depriving small shareholders of their ability to challenge corrupt manage-
ment. 1d. at 3.
30. Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
31. Denny v. Health & Soc. Servs. Bd., 285 F. Supp. 526, 527 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
32. But see Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th
Cir. 1977) (involving indigent plaintiff in an insurance suit).
33. See, eg., Bass, 338 F. Supp. at 478.
34. Denny, 285 F. Supp. at 527; 11A WRIGHT, MLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 2954,
at 299-301.
35. See e.g., California ex reL Van De Kamp v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 766
F.2d 1319, 1325 (9th Cir. 1985).
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less worried about frivolous suits and more concerned with providing
the judicial review Congress intended under the statute. One student
commentator has argued that statutes providing for suits by "private
attorneys general" are situations in which Congress has already "de-
termined which policies are important enough" to excuse plaintiffs
from paying normal litigation costs. 36
The bond requirement's purpose in avoiding flimsy suits is under-
cut in the circuits which have declared that the bond is discretionary.
Requiring more than a nominal bond in every case forces plaintiffs to
put some of their own funds at risk.37 The lack of well-defined limits
for appropriate bond waivers, in the circuits that view the bond as
discretionary, may result in more flimsy suits being filed than in those
holding that the bond is mandatory.
C. Notifies Plaintiff of Maximum Extent of Liability
While the bond requirement may be viewed as a barrier to in-
junctive relief by some plaintiffs, it also provides a significant benefit
to them. The bond protects the plaintiff by setting the maximum price
that the plaintiff will have to pay if the court later determines that the
injunction was wrongful.38
Other courts have viewed the plaintiff's fulfillment of the bond
provision as consent to liability up to the amount of the bond, i.e., the
"price for the injunction. '39 The extent of the damages awarded may
36. Recovery Note, supra note 10, at 835 n.29.
37. See Dobbs, supra note 9, at 1119 (forcing plaintiffs to risk funds may discourage
the harassing plaintiff).
38. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 210 n.31 (3d Cir. 1990) (cit-
ing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum &
Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 770 n.14 (1983)); see also Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air
Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 804-05 (3d Cir. 1989) (bond informs plaintiffs of price they can
expect to pay); Continuum Co. v. Incepts, Inc., 873 F.2d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 1989) (same);
Coyne-Delany Co. v. Capital Dev. Bd., 717 F.2d 385, 393 (7th Cir. 1983) (limiting liability
to the bond posted); Buddy Sys., Inc. v. Exer-Genie, Inc., 545 F.2d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 903 (1977) (same); Recovery Note, supra note 10, at 831-32
(stating that the bond should be the limit of plaintiff's liability); but see Diginet, Inc. v.
Western Union ATS, Inc., No. 91 C156, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7240, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 1,
1994) (holding that plaintiffs may lose the limitation on liability by asking court to waive
the bond because of their ability to satisfy judgment). The Fifth Circuit has creatively
allowed a preliminary injunction to remain in place when a plaintiff could not afford a
tenfold increase in the bond, but was willing to sign an undertaking to pay any damages
from the injunction. Continuum, 873 F.2d at 804.
39. Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 910 F.2d 1049, 1054
(2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d
793, 800 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977)); Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washing-
ton, 781 F.2d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Christ Gatzonis Elec. Contracting, Inc. v.
New York City Sch. Constr. Auth., No. CV-93-2418 (CPS), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9147, at
*16-17 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 1993) (same).
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vary, based on the prevailing standard of the circuit,40 but some mea-
sure of damages will generally be awarded if the court determines the
restrained party was wrongfully enjoined. There is no single standard
among all the circuits defining wrongful enjoinment,41 but one com-
mentator has suggested that an injunction "wrongfully restrains" a de-
fendant only when it "prohibits him from doing what a court finds he
had a legal right to do."42 Regardless of the standard used to deter-
mine wrongful enjoinment, the applicant must anticipate being liable
for damages, but only up to the amount of the bond. The concept of
"plaintiff consent" to liability is especially important since the court
will be obliged to award damages under the bond unless sufficient rea-
sons to the contrary exist.43
D. Protects the Court When It Has a Higher Than Usual Chance of
Committing Error
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, the bond provides the
means by which the court can make the defendant whole if it makes
an erroneous decision about the merits of the case.44 Courts have ad-
mitted that they are more likely to commit error after an attenuated
injunction hearing, in which they make only provisional findings of
fact.45 The Ninth Circuit, in declining to exempt Indian tribes from
the bond requirement under the auspices of sovereign immunity,46
40. The Eleventh Circuit described three different standards prevailing among the cir-
cuits in determining the novel question of its own: automatic damages, malicious prosecu-
tion, and the one it chose, judicial discretion. Siegelman, 925 F.2d at 388-90.
41. See e.g., Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 16 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that wrongful enjoinment occurs when the enjoined party had the right
all along to do what it was enjoined from doing); Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1054-55 (same).
Compare Alabama ex reL Siegelman v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 925 F.2d
385, 386 (11th Cir. 1991) (improper restraint when permanent injunction dissolved);
Coyne-Delany Co. v. Capital Dev. Bd., 717 F.2d 385,390 (7th Cir. 1983) (proper to award
damages on bond when grant of injunction reversed).
42. Recovery Note, supra note 10, at 829. The author discusses prevailing standards
and compares a variety of situations before recommending a standard. Id. at 836-42.
43. Alabama ex rel Siegelman v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 925 F.2d
385,390 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Coyne-Delany Co. v. Capital Dev. Bd., 717 F.2d 385,392
(7th Cir. 1983)). Many circuits follow a similar rule. The difference in circuits in awarding
damages under the bond is the subject of Recovery Note, supra note 10.
44. See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186,210 (3d Cir. 1990) (quot-
ing Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 804 (3d Cir. 1989) for the
proposition that requiring a bond to protect defendants is especially important in the pre-
liminary injunction context because the court has a higher chance of error).
45. Hoxworth, 903 F.2d at 210 (quoting Instant Air Freight, 882 F.2d at 804); Curtis
1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, No. C94-4117, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1514, at *170-71 (N.D.
Iowa Jan. 27, 1995).
46. Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d 715, 723 (9th Cir. 1986). Rule 65(c)
exempts the United States from posting bond and the tribe had requested that the immu-
nity be extended to them. Id
EXCEPTIONS TO RULE 65(e) GONE AWRYAugust 1995]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
summarized the reassurance that the courts receive from having the
bond in place. The court felt that granting the tribes a de facto perma-
nent waiver for posting security would make courts hesitant in grant-
ing tribes injunctive relief, for there would be no security "available to
compensate for damages caused by an improvidently issued
injunction. '47
E. History of Rule 65(c)
Rule 65(c) is basically derived from section 18 of the Clayton
Act,48 as it was enacted in 1914. 49 Prior to that, the first enactment
addressing security for injunctions in the federal courts left the deci-
sion whether to require security "in the discretion of the court or
judge. '50 The court was allowed the same discretion in deciding
whether to grant the order "with or without security" in section 263 of
the Judiciary Act of 1911.51 Congress repealed this discretionary lan-
guage and replaced it with section 18 of the Clayton Act.5 2 This sec-
tion eventually became "the basic language of the judicial code and of
rule 65." 5 3 Section 18 of the Clayton Act provided that
no restraining order or interlocutory order of injunction shall issue,
except upon the giving of security by the applicant in such sum as
the court or judge may deem proper, conditioned upon the payment
of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any
party who may be found to have been wrongfully enjoined or re-
strained thereby.54
While the early Judiciary Act left the decision whether to require se-
curity to the court's discretion, the language of the Clayton Act made
the security a mandatory condition precedent to the issuance of the
injunction or restraining order. Under the Clayton Act, the court was
to determine the bond amount sufficient to cover "the payment of
such costs and damages" that might be incurred by the party if wrong-
fully enjoined. 55 The Judicial Code of 1926 subsequently incorporated
the language requiring security for injunctions from the Clayton Act
47. Id. at 724.
48. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 17, 38 Stat. 730, 737 (1914).
49. Dobbs, supra note 9, at 1175. Professor Dobbs described the chronological devel-
opment in Appendix II of his Article.
50. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 7, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (cited by Dobbs, supra note 9, at
1174).
51. Judiciary Act of 1911, ch. 231, § 263, 36 Stat. 1087, 1162 (repealed 1914).
52. Clayton Act § 17, 38 Stat. at 737. For other discussions of the history of Rule
65(c), see Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, No. C94-4117, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1514, at
*166 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 27, 1995); Dobbs, supra note 9, at 1174-75; Recovery Note, supra note
10, at 829 n.6.
53. Dobbs, supra note 9, at 1175.
54. Clayton Act § 18, 38 Stat. at 738.
55. Id.
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into its general provisions.56 The language of the security requirement
in Rule 65(c) is virtually the exact language adopted from the Judicial
Code and has governed the bond requirement in federal courts since
1914.57
The intent of the security requirement is clear on the face of the
Act-the bond was designed to serve as a fund from which the de-
fendant could be compensated for wrongful enjoinment, with the ex-
act amount left to the court's discretion. Given this mandatory
directive, it is surprising that courts have come to hold that the bond
itself is discretionary.
H. A Discretionary or Mandatory Rule?
A. Mandatory with Narrow Exceptions
Recently, the Third,58 Fourth,59 Fifth,60 Seventh,61 and Federal62
Circuits have interpreted the bond requirement as mandatory under
the Rule and have held waiver of the bond in all but certain limited
circumstances 63 to be reversible error. In carving out exceptions to
the mandatory bond requirement, these circuits have formulated
guidelines for the district courts to follow in considering which plain-
tiffs can be characterized as proceeding in the "public interest," in bal-
ancing hardships to the litigants, and in determining the bond amount
and articulating reasons for the chosen amount.
56. Judicial Code of 1926, § 266,44 Stat. 863,909 (1926) (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 328).
57. Recovery Note, supra note 10, at 829 n.6. The Rule's additional language focused
on the distinction between the preliminary injunction and the TRO. Dobbs, supra note 9,
at 1175. "What little material there is generally available on the promulgation of the rules
does not indicate extensive debate or reconsideration of rule 65 at all." Id.
58. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186,209-11 (3d Cir. 1990); Instant
Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 803-05 (3d Cir. 1989); Frank's GMC
Truck Ctr., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1988); see infra notes
64-81 and accompanying text.
59. District 17, United Mine Workers v. A & M Trucking, Inc., 991 F.2d 108, 110 (4th
Cir. 1993); Maryland Dep't of Human Resources v. United States Dep't of Agric., 976 F.2d
1462, 1483 (4th Cir. 1992); see infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
60. Phillips v. Chas. Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127, 130-31 (5th Cir. 1990); Continuum
Co. v. Incepts, Inc., 873 F.2d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 1989); see infra notes 88-90 and accompany-
ing text.
61. Gateway E. Ry. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 35 F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 1994); see
infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
62. Chemlawn Servs. Corp. v. GNC Pumps, Inc., 823 F.2d 515 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (re-
versing preliminary injunction in patent infringement dispute for failure to require security
bond and findings under Rule 52(a)); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 805 F.2d 380
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (same).
63. See, e.g., Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 219-20 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied
sub nom. Snider v. Temple Univ., 502 U.S. 1032 (1992) (adopting a public interest
exception).
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(1) Third Circuit
In a trilogy of decisions written in the space of two years, the
Third Circuit clearly articulated the policy reasons underlying the
mandatory requirement of the bond under Rule 65(c). 64 Two of the
three cases decided the issue of whether the bond could be waived in a
commercial dispute between parties with adequate resources for post-
ing the bond. In both cases, the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's waiver of the bond, holding that circumstances warranting an
exception did not exist, and without the bond, the court would be
foreclosed from later awarding a remedy if it were determined that
the defendant was wrongfully enjoined.65
In the third case, Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Company,66
the Third Circuit again reversed the district court's decision to waive
the bond. In Hoxworth, a class of penny stock investors sought an
injunction against a securities firm and its president, alleging securities
fraud and civil RICO violations.67 The plaintiffs sought a preliminary
injunction to keep the company's president from transferring monies
overseas during the litigation, an action that would potentially have
left the plaintiffs without recovery even if they had prevailed at trial.6s
The district court based its waiver of the bond requirement on the
lack of a "'risk of monetary harm to the defendants' in complying with
the preliminary injunction and 'because of the chilling effect such a
requirement would have on the plaintiffs' ability to proceed with this
case.' 69 In reversing the trial court's decision to waive the bond, the
Third Circuit anchored its reasoning on the plain language of Rule
65(c), which "admits no exceptions. ' 70 Basing its strict interpretation
on the "text and policies of [R]ule 65(c)," 71 the court relied most
heavily on three policy reasons. First, the court pointed out that an
incorrect interlocutory order may harm the defendant, for the bond
provides the only fund from which the defendant may be compen-
64. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 210 (3d Cir. 1990); Instant
Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 804-05 (3d Cir. 1989); Frank's GMC
Truck Ctr., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 103 nn. 5 & 7 (3d Cir. 1988).
65. Frank's GMC Truck, 847 F.2d at 103; Instant Air, 882 F.2d at 805.
66. 903 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1990).
67. Id. at 189.
68. Id. at 191-93.
69. Id. at 209 (quoting Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 1989 U.S. Dist LEXIS
5729, at *34 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1989)).
70. Hoxworth, 903 F.2d at 210. The court quoted an earlier Tenth Circuit case for the
proposition that "Rule 65(c) states in mandatory language that the giving of security is an
absolute condition precedent to the issue of a preliminary injunction." Id. (quoting Atomic
Oil Co. v. Bardahl Oil Co., 419 F.2d 1097, 1100 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1063
(1970)).
71. Hoxworth, 903 F.2d at 210.
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sated.72 Second, because of the attenuated procedure and the higher
than usual chance of being wrong in a preliminary injunction hearing,
the protection that the bond provides is especially important.73 Third,
the court mentioned the protection that the bond provides the plain-
tiff in limiting liability to the amount of the bond if the defendant is
wrongly enjoined.74
The Third Circuit summarized its holding by flatly stating,
"Although the amount of the bond is left to the discretion of the
court, the posting requirement is much less discretionary. While there
are exceptions, the instances in which a bond may not be required are
so rare that the requirement is almost mandatory. '75 The only situa-
tion the court acknowledged as a potential exception occurs when the
injunction raises "no risk of monetary loss to the defendant. '76
Given the nature of the investment business in which defendants
were engaged, the Third Circuit found liquidity of the funds was cru-
cial and that the injunction created a significant likelihood of financial
harm.77 Although the bond requirement would "chill" plaintiffs' abil-
ity or willingness to seek relief, the Third Circuit held that the barrier
fulfilled another purpose of the bond requirement; it deterred "rash
applications for interlocutory orders [by] causing plaintiff to think
carefully beforehand."78
At the end of its discussion, the court analyzed the alternative
view of waiver in a footnote.79 Although it acknowledged that com-
mentators have recognized exceptions for waiving the bond in cases in
which the plaintiff is indigent or suing in the public interest, the court
specifically stated that "these exceptions, if they are to be drawn at all,
should be drawn narrowly." 80 With this statement of how neither of
the commentators' suggested exceptions would apply to the case
before it, the court vacated the injunction.8'
72. Id.
73. Id. at 210 n.31 (citing Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d
797, 804 (3d Cir. 1989)).
74. Id. at 210 (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 770 n.14 (1983)).
75. Id. (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100,
103 (3d Cir. 1988)).
76. Id. (quoting Frank's GMC Truck, 847 F.2d at 103).
77. Id
78. Id. at 211 (quoting Instant Air, 882 F.2d at 804).
79. Id at 211 n.32.
80. Id.
81. The court dismissed the two proffered exceptions by stating: "This record con-
tains no evidence that the plaintiffs are indigent. Moreover, we believe suits brought to
recover money lost speculating in penny stocks are not so overwhelmingly suffused with
the public interest as to justify the judicial rewriting of rule 65(c)." Id.
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(2) Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit found the bond requirement of Rule 65(c) to
be a mandatory one in reviewing the district court's waiver in a dis-
pute over administration of the food stamp program in Maryland De-
partment of Human Resources v. United States Department of
Agriculture.82 The district court, based on Maryland's representation
that the state could pay any judgment ultimately entered against it,
denied USDA's request that Maryland provide security.83 On review,
the Fourth Circuit cited Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., hold-
ing that failure to require the bond before issuing the preliminary in-
junction was reversible error because USDA risked financial harm
once the preliminary injunction issued whether or not the state would
be financially responsible.84 The Fourth Circuit stressed that "[t]he
district court's refusal to require a bond cannot be defended as the
reasonable exercise of discretion to set a 'sum as the court deems
proper' under the Rule.8 5 One year later, the court similarly vacated
a preliminary injunction enjoining a trucking company from subcon-
tracting work in violation of its contract with the union because the
district court had not required the union to post security.86 The
Fourth Circuit again stated, "The rule is unambiguous, and the failure
to require a bond... is reversible error. '87
(3) Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has also held that security must be posted under
Rule 65(c) before a preliminary injunction may issue. In a trade-se-
cret dispute over rights to computer software, the district court par-
tially denied the defendant's request to increase the security
supporting the injunction from $200,000 to $5 million and compro-
mised by setting the bond at $2 million.88 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
first discussed the policies underlying the bond requirement and criti-
cized courts that would waive the bond, leaving the defendant with
nothing against which to recover damages.89 However, in its decision,
the court alleviated some of the hardship to the plaintiff in procuring a
bond at ten times the original amount by leaving the original $200,000
bond in place and allowing the plaintiff to file an undertaking with the
court that the original "amount of the bond [would] not limit the
82. 976 F.2d 1462 (4th Cir. 1992).
83. Id. at 1483.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1483 (quoting Hoxworth, 903 F.2d at 210).
86. District 17, United Mine Workers v. A & M Trucking, Inc., 991 F.2d 108, 111 (4th
Cir. 1993).
87. Id. at 110 (quoting Maryland Dep't of Human Resources, 976 F.2d at 1483).
88. Continuum Co. v. Incepts, Inc., 873 F.2d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 1989).
89. Id. at 803-04.
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amount of damages for which it might be liable.., as a result of a
wrongful issuance of the injunction." 90
(4) Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit, in evaluating the adequacy of the injunction
bond in a dispute between railways over track rights,91 held the secur-
ity to be mandatory9 but the amount of security to be fully within the
discretion of the district court. The appellate court in Gateway East-
ern Railway v. Terminal Railroad Association, engages in one of the
rare discussions of the method for setting the bond amount that the
district court should follow. The court found "the district court never
articulated the reason for requiring [the] amount [it did]" and re-
manded the case for a more definite statement.93
(5) Undecided Circuits
Three circuits, the First, Eighth, and Eleventh, have not squarely
addressed whether the bond is discretionary or mandatory, but two of
them have come close to finding it mandatory in other contexts.94 The
First Circuit also prescribed a test for appropriate waiver of the bond,
without finding the bond itself to be mandatory or discretionary.95
B. Discretionary Rule
Despite the history of Rule 65(c) and the clearly articulated pur-
poses discussed by other circuits that support a mandatory bond, the
Second, 96 Sixth,97 Ninth,98 and Tenth 99 Circuits have found the re-
90. Id. at 804. The Fifth Circuit also found reversible error and vacated a preliminary
injunction when the district court had held no hearing or required security for before issu-
ing the injunction. Phillips v. Chas. Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1990).
91. Gateway E. Ry. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 35 F.3d 1134, 1134 (7th Cir. 1994).
92. Id. at 1141 (citing American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d
589, 597 (7th Cir. 1986)).
93. Id. at 1141-42. The Seventh Circuit had earlier held that, even though it had rec-
ognized an exception in certain cases, the "court should entertain and expressly rule on
[defendant's] request" for security, and "absent extraordinary circumstances, the court errs
in not granting it." Reinders Bros., Inc. v. Rain Bird E. Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44, 54 (7th
Cir. 1980); see also Chambers v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 863 F. Supp. 900, 907 (E.D. Wis.
1994) (recognizing the rule as mandatory).
94. The Eighth Circuit has reviewed the bond question for a case in which the district
court completely neglected to consider the question of requiring a bond. Rathmann Group
v. Tanenbaum, 889 F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1989); see also Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade,
No. C94-4117, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1514, at *165, *172 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 27, 1995) (finding
that "[a]Imost without exception ... courts in [the Eighth] circuit have required a bond
before issuing a preliminary injunction").
95. Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, 679 F.2d 978, 999-1000 (1st
Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1983).
96. Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 632 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Ferguson); Inter-
national Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932
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quirement of the bond itself, rather than the amount, to be
discretionary.
C. The Sixth Circuit Opens the Door to Confusion: The Urbain Decision
Courts uniformly required a bond as a condition precedent to is-
suing a preliminary injunction or TRO prior to 1954.100 However, in
Urbain v. Knapp Brothers Manufacturing Co.,10 the Sixth Circuit held
that the waiver of a bond by the district court was not reversible error
based on an unsupported interpretation of the language of Rule 65(c).
The plaintiffs in Urbain, decided in 1954, were very different from the
plaintiffs typically entitled to a bond waiver today; they were not indi-
gent, nor were they suing under a federal statute in the public interest.
The dispute in Urbain was over the infringement of two patents
by a manufacturer of display board constructions and chalk troughs.
The federal district court in Ohio granted an order, as part of a declar-
atory judgment proceeding brought by the defendants, restraining
plaintiffs from prosecuting a companion action in a federal district
court in Illinois.10 2 The Sixth Circuit held that the granting of the in-
junction was proper, falling within the discretion of the district court
to stay proceedings in another district. 10 3 The district court had the
right to enjoin proceedings in which the separate defendants were in
(1974) (citing Ferguson); Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665, 675 (2d Cir. 1961); see infra
notes 113-120 and accompanying text.
97. Urbain v. Knapp Bros. Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 810, 815-16 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 930 (1955); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 100 (6th Cir.
1982); Roth v. Bank of Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 538-39 (6th Cir. 1978).
98. See California ex reL Van De Kamp v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 766 F.2d
1319, 1325 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The court has discretion to dispense with the security require-
ment, or to request mere nominal security, where requiring security would effectively deny
access to judicial review.").
99. The Tenth Circuit has not held the bond itself to be mandatory: "[A]t this point
we do not decide, nor do we even suggest, whether a bond is mandatory to validate the
preliminary injunction." Coquina Oil Corp. v. Transwestern Pipeline, 825 F.2d 1461, 1462
(10th Cir. 1987). However, it has required the trial court, at a minimum, to consider
whether "a particular case justif[ies] the unusual practice of leaving the enjoined party
bereft of security." Id. at 1462 (dismissing case for lack of jurisdiction after district court
waived bond without discussion). An earlier case, decided by the Tenth Circuit nearly
thirty years before Coquina, had held the question of security to be within the "wide dis-
cretion" of the trial judge and stated that if there was an absence of proof of likelihood of
harm, "certainly no bond is necessary." Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Ref. Co., 338 F.2d
780, 782 (10th Cir. 1964) (citing Urbain v. Knapp Bros. Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930 (1955)).
100. Two narrow exceptions were recognized: a federal court had acquired jurisdiction
over property in litigation and a court could control its calendar and stay its own hand.
Dobbs, supra note 9, at 1100.
101. 217 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930 (1955).
102. Id. at 813.
103. Id. at 815.
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privity and the plaintiffs ana the issues were identical.1°  While that
part of the holding was soundly reasoned, the Sixth Circuit may have
unnecessarily interpreted the text of Rule 65(c) too broadly.10 5
Two sentences in the Urbain decision cracked the door wide
enough for confusion to rush in.
The rule leaves it to the District Judge to order the giving of security
in such sum as the court considers proper. This would indicate
plainly that the matter of requiring security in each case rests in the
discretion of the District Judge.l
Rather than properly limiting the court's discretion to the
amount of the bond, the court held the bond to be wholly discretion-
ary.10 7 The Urbain court cited no support for its interpretation of
Rule 65(c), and it explicitly ignored other circuits' decisions holding
the bond to be mandatory. 08 It was absolutely unnecessary for the
court to reinterpret the mandatory language of Rule 65(c) in order to
find that no bond was required on the facts of Urbain. A sensible
exception could have and should have been carved out for orders stay-
ing identical actions in other courts where there was no likelihood of
harm to the enjoined party. Other circuits, in turn, applied the discre-
tionary reading of Rule 65(c) to a variety of situations far beyond the
circumstances present in Urbain.10 9
D. Expanding Confusion: Other Circuits' Misuse of Urbain as Precedent
Many cases since the Urbain decision have expanded on its inter-
pretation of Rule 65(c) as discretionary, even where such an interpre-
tation was unnecessary to reach the intended result. These cases have
104. Id
105. The Sixth Circuit could have exclusively found the bond waiver was appropriate
based on the marginal risk of loss to appellants because they were getting a full trial on the
merits in the Ohio court. "Moreover, in the circumstances encountered here, it would
appear that no material damage will ensue to appellants from the failure of the district
judge to require a bond of appellees." Urbain, 217 F.2d at 816.
106. Id at 815-16 (emphasis in original).
107. Id
108. Id. The majority attempted to distinguish Hopkins v. Wallin, 179 F.2d 136 (1949),
a Third Circuit case, finding that the injunction in Hopkins was vacated for other "reasons
than the violation of Rule 65(c)." The majority also ignored a case cited by the dissent
from the Seventh Circuit vacating an injunction for failure to require a bond. Id at 818
(quoting Chatz v. Freeman, 204 F.2d 764, 768 (7th Cir. 1958)).
109. The Sixth Circuit may also have added to the confusion surrounding the extent of
the court's discretion by recently citing to the century-old decision of Russell v. Farley, an
1881 Supreme Court decision that discussed the injunction bond prior to the existence of
Rule 65(c). Division No. 1, Detroit, Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. CONRAIL, 844 F.2d
1218,1227 n.15 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433 (1881) for the proposi-
tion that the court "may order a bond that does not completely secure the enjoined party
or the court may decline to order a bond, if necessary 'for the purpose of effectuating
justice between the parties"').
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cited Urbain, and in turn have been used as support by other courts,
with little critical re-evaluation of the plain language or the history of
the Rule.
Within the Sixth Circuit, the district courts have cited Urbain for
the precedent that the matter of whether to require security is left to
the court's discretion. The Urbain precedent has been used to waive
the bond in injunctions involving random drug testing" 0 and trade-
mark infringement"' and to support confused applications in the
lower courts in the District of Columbia and Ninth Circuits. 1 2
(1) Second Circuit
One of the stepping-stones to the current confusion about the
Rule is the Second Circuit's decision in Ferguson v. Tabah." 3 In Fer-
guson, a shareholders' derivative action, the court reviewed the dis-
trict court's entry of an order impounding stock without requiring the
posting of a bond. 14 The district court had ordered the impoundment
of a quarter of a million shares alleged to have been fraudulently is-
sued and, at the time of the order, escrowed in a contemporaneous
state court action. The Second Circuit followed the holding of Urbain,
with little analysis of its facts, in allowing the district court the same
vague "wide discretion.., to require no bond." 115 Ferguson was simi-
lar to Urbain in that it involved a situation in which two lawsuits were
proceeding simultaneously."l 6 In reviewing the record, the court
stated, "The bizarre history of the issue and transfers of the one mil-
lion shares fairly demands that the court take physical possession of
the certificates .... Any possibility that [the plaintiff's] victory might
be turned into a pyrrhic one due to the law of negotiable stock trans-
fers in . . . other jurisdiction[s], warrants the impounding of the
stock."117
More appropriately, however, rather than repeating the Urbain
court's misinterpretation of Rule 65(c), the Ferguson court should
have allowed the injunction to stand without security based narrowly
on the lack of a showing of likelihood of harm to the enjoined party.
110. Plane v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 1358, 1374 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
111. Express Mortg. Brokers, Inc. v. Simpson Mortg. Inc., No. 94-71056, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8764, at *16 (E.D. Mich. May 6, 1994).
112. See, e.g., California ex reL Van De Kamp v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 766
F.2d 1319, 1325 (9th Cir. 1985); Toussaint v. Rushen, 553 F. Supp. 1365, 1383 (N.D. Cal.
1983); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971).
113. 288 F.2d 665, 675 (2d Cir. 1961).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. In Ferguson, one suit was proceeding in New York state court, the other in federal
district court; in Urbain, two suits were proceeding in federal district courts in Ohio and
Illinois.
117. Ferguson, 288 F.2d at 673.
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Also, the decision could have been based on an exception already rec-
ognized in the federal courts at that time, namely that no bond was
required "where the injunctive order was issued 'to aid and preserve
the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter involved."'u 8 Unfortu-
nately, the court went further than necessary, contributing to the con-
fusion in the Second Circuit and in other circuits.1 19 The Second
Circuit, in a case following Ferguson's "wide discretion" language,
merely cites to Ferguson to affirm the district court's waiver of a bond,
even though the district court had never even considered the bond
question. 120
(2) The Seventh Circuit's Digression
The Seventh Circuit also started down the path to allowing un-
bounded discretion in 1972 with its holding in Scherr v. Volpe,"2' in
which citizens challenged a state highway project for failing to comply
with NEPA. In Scherr, the court stated, "the matter of requiring a
security in the first instance was recognized in Urbain as also resting
within the discretion of the district judge."' 22 Unfortunately, the
Scherr decision, because it was one of the first cases involving an in-
junction under NEPA, was in turn widely cited by lower courts, and
the confusion spread. The Seventh Circuit did not reverse the impact
of its discretionary directive until 1986, in American Hospital Supply
Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd.,"-3 when it held the posting of a bond
to be mandatory. 24
In another challenge under the newly-enacted NEPA, Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,"25 brought by a group of non-
profit environmentalists, the court cites Urbain for the proposition
that "[i]t is well settled that Rule 65(c) gives the Court wide discretion
in the matter of requiring security.""26 Even though the government
118. Id. at 675 (citing Magidson v. Duggan, 180 F.2d 473, 479 (8th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied 339 U.S. 965 (1950)); 11A WRiGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 2954, at 305.
119. See, e.g., Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 632 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Fergu-
son for the proposition that "the amount of any bond to be given upon the issuance of a
preliminary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court"); International
Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974)
(citing Ferguson in stating that "the district court may dispense with security where there
has been no proof of likelihood of harm to the party enjoined").
120. Clarkson, 544 F.2d at 632.
121. 466 F.2d 1027, 1035 (7th Cir. 1972).
122. Id.
123. 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986).
124. Id. at 597. Compare Reinders Bros., Inc. v. Rain Bird E. Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44,
54 (7th Cir. 1980) (shifting toward a mandatory view of bond by holding "absent extraordi-
nary circumstances, the [district] court errs in not granting it").
125. 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971).
126. Id. at 168.
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had requested a bond of $750,000 (with increases of $2.5 million for
each month of delay) to offset estimated lost revenues, the court set
the bond at a nominal $100.127 While the nominal bond may have
been appropriate for a challenge brought under NEPA,128 the use of
the Urbain reasoning was unsound. 129
The importance of the mandatory-or-discretionary distinction lies
primarily in the extent of guidance that the court of appeals' opinions
provide to the lower courts. In circuits in which a bond is considered
mandatory, the courts have been more effective in establishing guide-
lines for exceptions for the lower courts to follow. 30 When the indi-
vidual circuit defines the bond requirement as discretionary, there is
little principled discussion of the sufficient criteria for the bond waiver
or when the waiver is appropriate. Conversely, in circuits in which the
bond is held to be mandatory, the waiver of the bond by the trial court
is analyzed fully, clear guidelines are established for lower courts to
follow, and the bond waiver is allowed in only "exceptional" cases.
111. Exceptions to the Rule
Certain exceptions to the bond requirement have been recog-
nized in most circuits. Waiver of the bond has been held appropriate
when the enjoined party faces "no likelihood of material harm";' 31
when the court is acting to preserve its subject matter jurisdiction; 32
when the plaintiff is determined to be indigent and is suing to retain a
basic service or public benefit;133 or when the plaintiff is challenging
federal agency action under NEPA.134 The development of each of
these exceptions is discussed infra.
The lower courts have had much more difficulty in setting a bond,
or justifying waiver of the bond, in cases involving institutional plain-
tiffs serving or benefitting indigent clients, such as schools or hospitals,
or plaintiffs suing under federal statutes other than NEPA, such as
ERISA. These situations are less straightforward because the plain-
127. Id. at 168-69.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 165-75.
129. This unsound reasoning was used by a district court in the Ninth Circuit as well.
Toussaint v. Rushen, 553 F. Supp. 1365, 1383 (N.D. Cal. 1983). The court waived the bond
for prisoners challenging conditions under the Eighth Amendment, citing to Urbain as one
case in a long string citation for support of its conclusion that "no security should be re-
quired ... [for] this preliminary injunction." Id.
130. See Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201,219 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom.
Snider v. Temple Univ., 502 U.S. 1032 (1992) (following Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture
& Piano Moving, 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1984)).
131. See infra notes 135-45.
132. See infra notes 146-49.
133. See infra notes 150-64.
134. See infra notes 165-75.
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tiffs' indigent status is not clear, and there is conflict between the pur-
poses of the bond requirement and the goals of the federal statute on
point.
A. No Likelihood of Material Harm
Under the Rule, the court is to set the amount of the bond, "in
such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and
damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to
have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. '135 It follows that if the
court finds that there is no likelihood of harm to the defendant, or "no
costs or damages [will be] incurred," then the court has discretion to
set the bond at zero, thereby waiving it. Three of the earliest cases to
find that the bond requirement was discretionary also found no likeli-
hood of harm to the defendant. 136 On its face, the Rule's only re-
quirement is that the bond be set in the amount of costs or damages to
be incurred by the enjoined party. If the court determines that the
defendant will not sustain damage from being enjoined, then there is
no reason to set the bond at an amount above costs.
Regardless of the context, courts have required defendants to
provide evidence of damages from a wrongful enjoinment.137 How-
ever, in some cases, it is quite difficult for a defendant to quantify
damages in monetary terms. For example, in Galper v. United States
Shoe Corp., involving a dispute over a franchise contract, the defend-
135. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c) (emphasis added). Courts have based waiver of the bond at
least partially on the lack of likelihood of harm to the defendant. See Crowley v. Local No.
82, Furniture & Piano Moving, 679 F.2d 978, 1000 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds,
467 U.S. 526, 551 (1984) (minimal burden imposed on defendants from absence of secur-
ity); cf. Systems Operations v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1146 (3d Cir.
1977) (declining to decide whether court could waive bond requirement where defendant
would not be monetarily harmed by injunction); Galper v. United States Shoe Corp., 815
F. Supp. 1037, 1045 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (finding no bond necessary where defendants would
not be harmed by injunction); International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1356
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (stating court may waive bond absent proof of
likelihood of harm to party enjoined).
136. The Urbain court found "no material damage [would] ensue to appellants from
the failure of the District Judge to require [a] bond." Urbain v. Knapp Bros. Mfg. Co., 217
F.2d 810, 816 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930 (1955); see also Clarkson Co. v.
Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 632 (2d Cir. 1976) ("little likelihood of harm to the parties en-
joined"); Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 338 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1964)
(holding no bond necessary when "there is an absence of proof showing a likelihood of
harm"); Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665, 675 (2d Cir. 1961) ("[t]here has been-absolutely
no showing of probable loss because of the restraining order"); Frank's GMC Truck Ctr.,
Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding failure to require a
bond reversible error "absent circumstances where there is no risk of monetary loss to the
defendant").
137. See Division No. 1, Detroit, Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. CONRAIL, 844 F. 2d
1218, 1227 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that defendant must put damages in evidence).
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ants did not offer evidence that "maintaining the status quo will cause
them any injury."'1 38 The court found no injury in spite of the defend-
ants' fear that the plaintiff would drive away customers and reduce its
business goodwill. 39
In the Seventh Circuit's consideration of a preliminary injunction
to stop the sale of timber in part of a national forest, Judge Posner
acknowledged the difficulty of quantifying the intangible loss of enjoy-
ment of the forest in its pristine state (if the injunction were not
granted) versus the defendant's damages.140 The damages to the For-
est Service would be the delay in receipt of revenues from the logging
until after a full hearing and "would be at most the time value of the
profit component of the revenue, a value which no one has bothered
to quantify."'1 41 The opinion also discounted the Forest Service's argu-
ment that allowing the injunction would cause irreparable damage to
its reputation as manager of the national forest because the Service
had failed to put forth "any evidence of the aggregate impact of [such]
suits" on the timber cutting program. 142
Similarly, if a court can attribute the impact of the damage of an
injunction to another party, it may discount the potential damages in
setting the amount of the bond. In Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture
& Piano Moving,143 union members brought suit under the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act challenging the election
of the Local's officers. 44 The First Circuit, in considering whether the
bond was properly waived by the district court, found that "[n]o great
burden will be imposed on [the Union] ... because the institutional
appellant, the Local, whose contributing members include plaintiffs,
will bear the costs of compliance.' 45 The court's determination that
there is no likelihood of material harm is not a true exception-rather,
it is a factor to be considered in setting the amount of the bond. On
the other hand, waiver of the bond after the court has determined that
the defendant will sustain damages if enjoined is an exception to the
Rule.
An analogous situation occurs when a court waives the bond for
an injunction issued to protect the court's jurisdiction over the subject
138. 815 F. Supp. at 1045.
139. Id. at 1044.
140. Cronin v. United States Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 445 (7th Cir. 1990).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 446.
143. 679 F.2d 978, 981-82 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1989).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1000.
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matter involved.146 Courts also have not required a bond when the
plaintiff was vindicating constitutional rights and the court determined
that the defendant would not suffer any "material" damages due to
the injunction. These cases have typically involved free speech
rights' 47 or due process rights'4 and the bond has been appropriately
waived.149 In both types of cases the court does not expect the en-
joined party to incur monetary damages.
B. Indigent Plaintiffs and Public Benefits Cases
Courts and commentators have recognized an exception to the
bond requirement for indigent plaintiffs challenging the administra-
tion of public benefits under a federal statute or the Equal Protection
clause.150 The foundation cases in which bonds were waived for indi-
gent plaintiffs are Denny v. Health and Social Services Board'5' and
Bass v. Richardson.52 In Denny, the plaintiffs brought a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to Wisconsin's public benefits statute that re-
quired a continuous one-year residence before benefits could be re-
ceived.153 Although the court did not elaborate, it found that the
plaintiffs were "poor persons whose present action has been submit-
ted in forma pauperis; they are by hypothesis unable to furnish secur-
146. Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665, 675 (2d Cir. 1961) (citing Magidson v. Duggan,
180 F.2d 473, 479 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 965); 1A WRIG-, MIT..ER &
KANE, supra note 2, § 2954, at 305 n.36.
147. See, e.g., McCormack v. Township of Clinton, 872 F. Supp. 1320, 1328 (D.NJ.
1984) (enjoining city ordinance restricting political speech); Bukaka, Inc. v. County of Ben-
ton, 852 F. Supp. 807,813 (D. Minn. 1993) (enjoining enforcement of ordinance regulating
nude dancing clubs); Bloom v. O'Brien, 841 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D. Minn. 1993) (enjoining
state regulation of content of invoices of health care providers).
148. See, eg., Cohen v. Coahoma County, 805 F.Supp. 398,408 (N.D. Miss. 1992) (en-
joining sheriff from "inflicting physical pain upon prisoners in [his] custody ... for the
purpose of coercing information"); Rivera v. Dyett, No. 88 Civ. 4707, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13464, at *40 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1992) (enjoining prison from refusing to provide
toilet facilities for disabled prisoner); Plane v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 1358, 1374 (W.D.
Mich. 1990) (enjoining random urinalysis drug testing of civilian employees).
149. Dobbs, supra note 9, at 1119-21 (discussing free speech cases and distinguishing
those in which defendants are likely to be damaged). While Professor Dobbs was skeptical
of giving judges the discretion to not require a bond in "appropriate" free speech cases, id,
at 1120-21, it appears in the cases cited here that they have used it appropriately.
150. See Bartels v. Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (waiving bond require-
ment when injunctive relief sought by poor persons and suit involves important social con-
siderations); Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating that
indigents should not be required to post bond); Denny v. Health & Social Servs. Bd., 285 F.
Supp. 526, 526 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (indigent plaintiffs not required to post bond in action
based on equal protection violation); lA WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 2954,
at 299-301; Calderon, supra note 9, at 148.
151. 285 F. Supp. at 527.
152. 338 F. Supp. at 490.
153. 285 F. Supp. at 526-27.
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ity."'1 54 Arguably, waiving the bond requirement for plaintiffs
proceeding in forma pauperis furthers the goal of providing access to
the courts for those plaintiffs who would otherwise be denied life-sus-
taining benefits until the conclusion of a trial on the merits.155
The Bass court was much more specific about its reason for waiv-
ing security than was the court in Denny. In Bass, the plaintiffs sought
a preliminary injunction to restrain cut-backs in benefits under New
York's Medicaid Program.156 The court first pointed out that defend-
ants had not made any showing of the amount of damages they would
sustain.157 Second, the court determined that a "more important rea-
son" existed for waiving the bond.158 The Medicaid statute evidenced
"Congressional intent that the programs ... be vigorously and prop-
erly administered.... If any difference exists between the language of
Rule 65(c) and Congressional intent clearly embodied in the remedial
statutes at issue, the federal statutes control."' 59 The allegedly unlaw-
ful Medicaid cut-back would go unchecked if the bond amount were
set at the potentially large costs and damages of the state. Bass has
been read to stand for the broad equitable principle that the bond
requirement should not be imposed if to do so would block judicial
access for citizen enforcement under a federal statutory scheme. 160
A case decided four years after Bass, Bartels v. Biernat,'6' was
brought by handicapped residents of Milwaukee challenging the ad-
ministration of a construction contract for bus service under two fed-
eral statutes. In waiving the bond requirement, the court used
dangerously vague language, basing the waiver on the plaintiffs' in-
ability to afford the security and the "important social considerations"
at issue. 162 Factually, however, the plaintiffs in the case were seeking
relief under a federal statute and the waiver was granted specifically
to "remedy more flagrant abuses in federal administrative pro-
grams."'1 63 The imprecise nature of the "important social considera-
154. Id. at 527.
155. See 11A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 2954, at 299-301.
156. 338 F. Supp. at 480.
157. Id. at 490.
158. Id. at 491.
159. Id.
160. "[T]he legal system has a positive interest in citizen enforcement, and courts sit-
ting in equity should waive bond requirements to encourage citizen suits." Calderon, supra
note 9, at 150; Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, 679 F.2d 978, 1000 (1st
Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1983) (citing Bass for the proposition that
"no bond is required in suits to enforce important federal rights or 'public interests').
161. 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
162. Id. at 1019; see also Calderon, supra note 9, at 152 (arguing for an expansive ap-
proach and exemption in a "wide variety of public interest cases").
163. Bartels, 405 F. Supp. at 1019 (citing Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478
(S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
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tions" standard has caused predictable problems when applied by
other district courts. For instance, courts will often waive the security
requirement simply because applicants for injunctions cannot afford
the bond,164 and the district court then considers them "indigent."
Such waivers should not be applied when no federal statute is
involved.
C. Other Public Interest Litigants
Many of the cases dealing with indigent plaintiffs are also brought
in the public interest. The confusion that permeates the indigent ap-
plicant exception also abounds in defining which suits are brought in
the public interest and in determining which other situations appropri-
ately warrant waiver of the bond requirement.
Another major public interest exception was developed through a
line of cases that dealt with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), which became effective in 1970.165 Section 102(c) of NEPA
requires federal officials to file an environmental impact statement for
any "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment."1 66 If a court finds that the procedural require-
ments of the formal decision-making process of NEPA were not com-
164. See, eg., Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692,
701 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding indigence alone an appropriate circumstance to waive bond);
Brown v. Giuliani, 158 F.R.D. 251,270 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (waiving bond based on plaintiffs'
inability to afford it in challenge to city's AFDC processing guidelines); Doe v. Perales, 782
F.Supp. 201,206 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (waiving bond because plaintiffs did not have sufficient
resources to post one in challenge to reduction in Medicaid benefits); La Plaza Defense
League v. Kemp, 742 F. Supp. 792, 807 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (declining to order security
when plaintiffs did not have sufficient resources to post it to enjoin HUD from building
low-income housing on park); Governing Council of Pinoleville Indian Community v.
Mendocino County, 684 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (bond waived when suit was
brought on behalf of mostly indigent persons in dispute over use of tribal land); Walker v.
Pierce, 665 F. Supp. 831, 843-44 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (bond waived in challenge by indigent
plaintiffs to sale of mortgages by HUD); Toussaint v. Rushen, 553 F. Supp. 1365, 1383
(N.D. Cal. 1983), affd in par vacated in part, Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding that no security was required when suit was brought on behalf of poor
persons in challenge to California prison regulations). In Temple University, the court not
only looked to the status of the plaintiff, but also balanced the potential hardships to the
parties. Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 219 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom.
Snider v. Temple Univ., 502 U.S. 1032 (1992).
165. One authority reports,
By June 1975, 332 NEPA cases featuring 54 injunctions had been completed; an-
other 332 cases, with 65 injunctions, were still pending. Since 1974, NEPA cases
have been filed at the rate of 100 per year and injunctions have issued at the rate
of 12 per year.
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.2 at 818 (citing COUNCIL ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALrrY, 21ST ANN. REP. 234 (1991)). Rodgers also reports that NEPA deci-
sions in the lower federal courts number more than 2,000 as of July 1993. Id. § 9.3, at 839.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1994).
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plied with and irreparable harm may result, it may issue a preliminary
injunction. In the earliest cases to consider waiving the bond require-
ment after NEPA became effective, the court considered the plaintiff's
likelihood of success on the merits 67 and the plaintiffs' "right to judi-
cial review of administrative action. ' 168 The court held that NEPA
clearly evidenced Congressional intent to have private environmental
organizations assist in enforcing NEPA, stating that "[ilt would be a
mistake to treat a revenue loss to the government the same as pecuni-
ary damage to a private party."'169
Courts have extended the exception for preliminary injunctions
under NEPA to other "environmental litigation." In California ex rel.
Van de Kamp v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, a nonprofit envi-
ronmental citizen group challenged the amendments to an interstate
compact that managed the Lake Tahoe Basin. 170 The district court
waived the bond requirement for the nonprofit group and the en-
joined party that appealed the injunction.171 Relying on the earlier
NEPA cases, the court held it had the discretion to dispense with the
security requirement because: the bond requirement would otherwise
deny access to judicial review;172 Congress had provided for private
enforcement; 73 and the plaintiffs showed a strong likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits. 174
The injunction in Tahoe Regional enjoined a private party, how-
ever, not a federal agency that had misapplied regulations. The judi-
cial review discussed in the early NEPA cases referred to challenges of
federal agency action. The court expanded the meaning of judicial
review in Tahoe Regional to encompass a planning agency created by
167. Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1972). Probability of success on the merits
is one of four factors used to make the initial determination of whether the injunction
should issue at all. 11A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 2948.3, at 185. It
should only be a determination of whether to grant the preliminary injunction, not a factor
in setting the bond. The Scherr court also erroneously cited the discretionary language of
Urbain to support the waiver. 466 F.2d at 1035.
168. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971).
169. Id. at 169-70.
170. 766 F.2d -1319, 1319 (9th Cir. 1985).
171. Id. at 1325.
172. Id. One court inappropriately cited the possibility of denial of judicial review as a
reason for waiver of the bond requirement for an employee seeking reinstatement pending
trial for wrongful termination. Jeffreys v. My Friend's Place, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 639, 649
(M.D. Tenn. 1989). When denial of judicial review is used as a criterion to waive a bond, it
is meant in the sense of judicial review of administrative action, and to use it generically, as
the court does in Jeffreys, expands the exception.
173. Tahoe Regional, 766 F.2d at 1326. But see National Kidney Patients Ass'n v. Sulli-
van, 958 F.2d 1127, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("Rule 65(c) 'subsumes such generic policy con-
siderations' as the "'public interest' in encouraging plaintiffs to challenge agencies'
interpretations of their governing statutes").
174. Tahoe Regional, 766 F.2d at 1326.
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the compact and had the actual effect of denying commercial develop-
ment along the lakeshore.175
D. Emerging Exceptions for Other Federal Statutes
Courts have extended the reasoning of the NEPA and indigent appli-
cant exceptions by waiving the bond requirement if security would
effectively deny access to judicial review176 or if the suit is brought on
behalf of poor persons. 177 Courts may strain to find that defendants
will not be harmed and waive the bond on that basis. Waivers for
plaintiffs bringing suit under other federal social-policy statutes, such
as those governing the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) or the Labor Management Relations Act, have the ele-
ments of both public interest legislation and quasi-indigent plaintiffs.
Problems in misapplication of the exceptions have occurred when an
indigent plaintiff is suing a private party' 78 or when there is no federal
statute that specifically allows for judicial review. The best illustration
of this growing problem is with applications for waiver under a statute
such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).179
E. Balancing of Interests in Public Interest Cases
In an attempt to avoid some of the confusion engendered by the
variations in the other circuits, the First Circuit, without deciding
whether the bond was mandatory or discretionary, set out specific fac-
tors for determining when a district court should waive the security for
an injunction. In Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving,
the First Circuit reviewed the district court's waiver of the bond re-
quirement for plaintiffs seeking to enjoin the results of a questionable
union election under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act (LMRDA).180
The Crowley court began by acknowledging that different factors
were required for setting the bond in commercial and noncommercial
175. Tahoe Regiona 766 F.2d at 1326. Professor Dobbs cites another example from
the "Birmingham air crisis" in which manufacturers were temporarily restrained from con-
tinuing certain emissions in an order issued by the court at 1:45 a.m., based on outdated
figures, and later vacated.
176. See, e.g., Jeffreys v. My Friend's Place, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 639, 649 (M.D. Tenn.
1989) (bond waived for wrongfully terminated employee who would otherwise be denied
access to judicial review).
177. See, e.g., Warner v. Ryobi Motor Prods. Corp., 818 F. Supp. 907 (D.S.C. 1992)
(requiring indigent plaintiffs in ERISA suit to post nominal bond); Walker v. Pierce, 665 F.
Supp. 831, 843-44 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (waiving bond for indigent tenants in suit against HUD
to bar sale of mortgages).
178. See e.g., Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th
Cir. 1977) (plaintiff suing insurance company).
179. See infra Part V discussing this problem in depth.
180. 679 F.2d 978, 989-1001 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1984).
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cases. 81 The court differentiated the commercial cases, finding that
the hardship a bond may cause to the commercial applicant is less of a
factor because merchant-like parties "can be assumed capable of bear-
ing most bond requirements."'182 The court then summarized the non-
commercial cases, in which the rights prosecuted arose out of
comprehensive federal health and welfare statutes, and set forth a
two-part test based on the reasoning of the indigent-public benefits
cases.
183
First, the court should balance the possible loss to the enjoined
party with the hardship that the bond imposes on the applicant. Sec-
ond, the court should consider the impact of the bond requirement on
the enforcement of the important federal right the plaintiff seeks to
enforce in order to avoid restricting the federal right unduly. To un-
derscore its point, the First Circuit pointed to the greater adverse ef-
fect of the bond when "the applicant is an individual and the enjoined
party an institution that otherwise has some control over the appli-
cant," as compared with the situation in which both parties are indi-
viduals or institutions.'8 4
The Crowley court found the situation before it, in which individ-
ual union members challenged administration of union elections
under a federal statute, to be analogous to that of individual benefit
recipients who received waivers when challenging denial of benefits
under public benefits statutes. One commentator has argued that the
Crowley test would allow the bond waiver even in the absence of a
legislative scheme.'8 5 However, that interpretation would go beyond
the holding of Crowley. In Crowley the individual members of the
union brought suit under a specific federal statute, and a primary con-
sideration of the district court in issuing the injunction was the policy
of LMRDA "to encourage union members' suits to vindicate union
democracy.' 18 6
The Third Circuit, which had previously held the bond to be
mandatory under Rule 65(c), adopted the Crowley factors in the ex-
ception it carved out in Temple University v. White.'8 7 In Temple Uni-
versity, more than 140 hospitals sought to enjoin reductions in
Pennsylvania's Medicaid reimbursement rates.188 The hospitals ar-
181. Id. at 1000.
182. Id. at 1000.
183. Id. (citing Bartels v. Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Bass v.
Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
184. Id.
185. Calderon, supra note 9, at 159-60.
186. Crowley, 679 F.2d at 999.
187. 941 F.2d 201,219 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Snider v. Temple Univ., 502
U.S. 1032 (1992).
188. Temple Univ., 941 F.2d 201, 205.
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gued that Pennsylvania's rates were inadequate to meet the require-
ment of the Social Security Act and that the method used to
promulgate the rates did not comply with the Act.18 9 The district
court ordered the state's Department of Public Welfare to make ad-
vance payments to one of the hospitals, Sacred Heart, which was on
the verge of bankruptcy, without requiring Sacred Heart to post a
bond.19° The four payments of $500,000 each were advances against
future medical assistance payments. 19' The district court required the
payments in light of both underpayment of Medicaid rates to Sacred
Heart in previous years and the court's belief that it needed to make
some adjustment to prevent the insolvency of the hospital in the
interim.192
The Third Circuit applied the Crowley analysis to review whether
waiver of the bond was warranted. 193 In considering the first step of
the Crowley test, the hardship that the bond requirement would im-
pose, the court found Sacred Heart to be "on the brink of financial
ruin" and about to become insolvent without the district court's or-
dered relief.194 The Third Circuit balanced its finding against the risk
to the defendant, which the district court had determined faced "virtu-
ally no risk" in advancing the funds because the hospital would proba-
bly be entitled to as much or more money under the state's revised
Medicaid plan, once it was properly implemented. 95 Under the sec-
ond step of the Crowley analysis, the Third Circuit acknowledged that
the injunction was sought to enforce "important federal rights" under
the federal Medicaid statute and that the waiver was in the public in-
terest, since the hospital served a "disproportionate share of low in-
come patients."'196
Thus the two-step analysis articulated in Crowley, and adopted by
the Third Circuit in Temple University, allows for waiving the bond in
noncommercial disputes when important federal statutory rights are
at issue. While the Crowley test provides some necessary guidance to
the district courts in two circuits, there remain a good number of devi-
ations from the narrow exceptions described above.
189. Id at 205-07.
190. Id- at 206.
191. Id. at 218.
192. Ld.
193. Id at 219.
194. Id. at 219.
195. Id.
196. Id at 220.
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IV. Exceptions Gone Awry? Problems in Setting the Bond
Amount
Setting the appropriate bond amount is especially difficult for
lower courts in the circuits that have held the bond itself to be discre-
tionary. The "wide discretion" given these lower courts has allowed
them to stray more often and further from the original, narrow excep-
tions. Lower courts in all circuits have attempted to expand the ex-
ceptions discussed above, especially when requiring the bond would
keep an individual without financial resources from obtaining an in-
junction. Deviations from the original, narrow applications of the ex-
ceptions include reducing the bond amount to reflect the likelihood of
success on the merits of the injunction; setting a low amount when the
plaintiff appears financially responsible (and ignoring the limitation of
W.R. Grace); extending the indigency exception to middle-class par-
ties suing their insurers or former employers; or reading Congres-
sional purpose to waive the bond into an expanding number of federal
statutes. By far, the most serious and unresolved problem is the
number of lower courts that set or waive the security bond without
listing any reason whatsoever. 97
A. Imputing Likelihood of Success on the Merits
One of the most problematic developments in the decisions on
Rule 65(c) is the courts' willingness to impute "likelihood of success
on the merits." The determination of the applicant's likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits of the case is a crucial element in initially determin-
ing whether the injunction should be granted at all.198 Instead, lower
courts have used the factor not only in finding support for the injunc-
tion, but also in setting the amount of the bond.199
197. Without specific findings on the potential damages that could result from a wrong-
ful enjoinment, the appellate court must remand, if a bond was required, or vacate the
injunction, if the bond was not required, thus wasting valuable judicial resources. See
Gateway E. Ry. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 35 F.3d 1134, 1142 (7th Cir. 1994) (criticizing the
district court for providing no explanation for its decision to set the bond at the chosen
figure and remanding). The Federal Circuit has vacated at least two injunctions issued by
district courts that did not contain either findings of fact, required by Rule 52(a), or the
district courts' reasons for setting the particular bond amount under Rule 65(c).
Chemlawn Servs. Corp. v. GNC Pumps, Inc., 823 F.2d 515 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Digital Equip.
Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 805 F.2d 380 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
198. 11A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 2948.3, at 185-202. Once the
court determines that the likelihood of success and the other necessary factors support
issuing an injunction, the court should then go on to determine the separate question of the
bond amount.
199. See, e.g., Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., Nos. 94-5345 & 94-6472, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 13500, *14 (6th Cir. June 2, 1995) (affirming district court's waiver of
bond based on strength of plaintiff's case); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1035 (7th Cir.
1972) (recognizing plaintiffs' strong likelihood of success on merits weighed in district
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Discounting the defendant's potential damages by the court's
hasty determination of the plaintiff's likelihood of success at the in-
junction hearing defeats the compensatory purpose of the bond re-
quirement. Since the court's chance of being wrong after such an
attenuated hearing is significant enough to warrant the bond in the
first place, discounting the damages by the plaintiff's likelihood of suc-
cess reduces the protection provided by the bond, both to the defend-
ant and to the court.200
B. Setting Low Amount for Financially Responsible Plaintiffs
Before the Supreme Court's decision in W.R. Grace, courts occa-
sionally allowed the bond to be waived where the plaintiff appeared to
have the financial resources to pay a judgment if the injunction were
wrongfully issued.201 The Court, in W.R. Grace, adopted the common
law injunction bond rule, that recovery for damages is limited to the
amount of the bond. This rule renders bond waivers based solely on
the plaintiff's solvency manifestly unfair to defendants who would not
be able to collect any damages if wrongfully enjoined.2°2 However,
two district courts have considered waiving the bond based on the de-
fendant's financial ability to pay the judgment, ignoring the liability
limitation the bond imposes.20 3
court's decision to waive bond); Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, No. C94-4117, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1514, at *179 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 27, 1995) (setting bond at amount below de-
fendant's anticipated damages because court found plaintiff's likelihood of success on the
merits to be substantial); Express Mortg. Brokers, Inc. v. Simpson Mortg. Inc., No. 94-
71056, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8764, at *16 (E.D. Mich. May 6, 1994) (waiving bond be-
cause plaintiffs demonstrated strong likelihood of successes on merits); Stem's Miracle-
Gro Products, Inc. v. Shark Products, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1077, 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (setting
bond at amount below damage expectancy because plaintiff demonstrated strong likeli-
hood of successes on merits); Lambton Mfg. v. Young, 833 F. Supp. 610, 617 (W.D. Ky.
1993) (same). But see Continuum Co. v. Incepts, Inc., 873 F.2d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 1989)
(criticizing waivers based on likelihood of success on merits that deprive defendant of any
recourse for damages). In Christ Gatzonis Electrical Contracting, Inc v. New York City
School Construction Authority, the court considered the likelihood of success on the merits
in discussing the bond amount but did not issue the injunction because the plaintiffs had
not shown a likelihood of success sufficient to support the injunction. No. CV-93-2418,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9147, *18 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 1993).
200. See Continuum Co. v. Incepts, Inc., 873 F.2d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 1989) (criticizing
bond waivers as denying plaintiff recourse for damages).
201. See, ag., Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 338 F.2d 780, 782-83 (10th
Cir. 1964) (waiving bond because of plaintiff's apparent ability to pay damages).
202. Continuum Co., 873 F.2d at 803-04.
203. See Diginet, Inc. v. Western Union ATS, Inc., No. 91-C-156, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7240, *4-5 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 1994) (ultimately holding that the plaintiff was es-
topped from denying liability above the bond amount); Specialty Chems. & Servs., Inc. v.
Chandler, No. 1:87-CV-2338-MHS, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16090, at *16 (N.D. Ga. Sept.
26, 1988) (finding that plaintiff was "sufficiently solvent to pay defendants' cost should it
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C. Defendant's Failure to Show Damages or Request Bond
Appellate courts, in reviewing bond waivers, and district courts,
in allowing waivers, have sometimes based the waiver on the defend-
ant's failure to request that the bond be posted.20 4 Not only have
courts increasingly required the defendant to request that the bond be
posted or have it waived, but they have also waived it when the de-
fendant failed to provide evidence on damages, without giving the de-
fendant the chance to provide it.205 Even when the defendant does
provide damage evidence, courts have increasingly rejected that infor-
mation because the amount was too "speculative," 20 6 or "excessive
and unwarranted. ' 20 7 In Division No. 1, Detroit, Brotherhood of Lo-
comotives Engineers v. CONRAIL, the Sixth Circuit did the most
thorough analysis to date of the evidence required of the defendant to
support the bond request amount.20 8 In CONRAIL, the defendant
railroad was enjoined from changing the origination point for union
engineers and trainmen who worked its Detroit/Toledo route because,
the union argued, that origination point had been established through
lose at trial"). But see Continuum Co., 873 F.2d at 804 (allowing plaintiff to file undertak-
ing rather than post full amount of the bond).
204. See Diginet Inc. v. Western Union ATS, Inc., No. 91-C-156, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7240, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 1994) (finding that district court's failure to increase bond
amount for preliminary injunction was most likely due to defendant's failure to provide
amount to court that would cover damages); Bukaka, Inc. v. County of Benton, 852 F.
Supp. 807, 813 (D. Minn. 1993) ("Defendant does not appear to object to the waiver and
has not pointed to any costs or monetary damages it might incur if it were enjoined from
enforcing the code .. "); Galper v. United States Shoe Corp., 815 F.Supp. 1037, 1045
(E.D. Mich. 1993) (waiving bond because defendants had offered no evidence that main-
taining status quo would injure them).
205. Cronin v. United States Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439,446 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying
injunction but commenting that the Forest Service had not shown the court any evidence of
impact on timber program); Rivera v. Dyett, No. 88-Civ.-4707, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13464, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1992) (waiving because defendant did not provide proof
of damages); Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hydro Technologies, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 899, 901 (E.D.
Wis. 1992) (justifying bond's waiver because of two-month delay by defendant in request-
ing bond). The case placing the most extraordinary burden on the defendant is Wilson v.
Office of the Civilian Health & Med. Program of the Uniformed Servs., 866 F. Supp. 903,
910 (E.D. Va. 1994), in which the court waived the bond because the defendant had "of-
fered no evidence" to show plaintiff had adequate resources to post bond. Id (emphasis
added).
206. Chambers v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 863 F. Supp. 900, 907 (E.D. Wis. 1994)
(setting amount "in absence of any other information from parties").
207. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. AMA, 877 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(rejecting defendant's figures for a $1,750,000 bond as "incompetent hearsay and con-
clusory evidence" and setting bond at $100,000). But see Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson &
Co., 903 F.2d 186, 210 (3d Cir. 1990) (criticizing district court's finding that defendant
would not be harmed by having $11 million frozen in bank account).
208. Division No. 1, Detroit, Bhd. of Locomotives Eng'rs v. CONRAIL, 844 F. 2d
1218, 1229 (6th Cir. 1988) (discussing the "need for specific evidence" in support of a bond
request).
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collective bargaining.209 The district court set the bond at $750,000,
based on figures provided by CONRAIL that significant time-delays
resulting from the injunction would cause extensive business losses.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit scrutinized CONRAIL's evidence much
more closely than had the district court.
First, the appellate court based its skepticism of the high prospec-
tive business loss figures on CONRAIL's failure to specifically point
to any business it had lost because of time-delays caused by the in-
junction. 210 Second, the court was skeptical about the lack of histori-
cal data or other evidence provided to support the time-delays,
despite the railroad's maintenance of extensive efficiency records. 211
The Sixth Circuit determined that, based on the defendant's vague as-
sertions, the district court was forced to speculate about Conrail's ac-
tual loss of business to set the amount.21 2 It remanded to the district
court for more specific findings on which to base the bond.213
D. Extending the Indigency Exception
Given the well-developed exception for indigent plaintiffs, some
lower courts have strained to find indigency status for plaintiffs, using
the term as a proxy for automatic waiver of the bond. These courts
often do not consider whether the enjoined party is a government en-
tity, a private company, or even whether the plaintiff is truly indigent,
e.g., proceeding in forma pauperis. In one case, the court used a very
loose definition of indigency to enjoin the Department of Education
from publishing the loan default rates for the Canterbury Career
School.21 4 While the court omits any explicit reason for waiving the
bond,21 5 the paragraph preceding the waiver describes the indigent
students who benefit from the school's education; it is a fair assump-
tion that this status was imputed to the plaintiff-school in granting the
waiver.216
209. Id. at 1219.
210. Id. at 1228.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1229.
213. Id. at 1228-29.
214. Canterbury Career School, Inc. v. Riley, 833 F. Supp. 1097, 1106 (D.N.J. 1993).
215. "This court... finds, in its discretion, that it is appropriate to dispense with such a
requirement." Id. at 1106.
216. The education "allows a large number of impoverished persons to become pro-
ductive. . . ." Id. at 1105. Compare Governing Council of Pinoleville Indian Community v.
Mendocino County, 684 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1988). The court correctly identified the
plaintiffs as indigent and waived the bond because the application for injunction was
"brought on behalf of a group of mostly indigent persons." Id. at 1047. However, the
court failed to address the inequity to the enjoined party, who was prevented from operat-
ing an asphalt plant and stood to incur significant damages from being enjoined. See id. at
1044.
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Various courts' treatment of commercial and noncommercial par-
ties as evoking the same concerns has resulted in inequitable treat-
ment of similarly-situated parties. Bonds have been waived for
middle-class plaintiffs seeking to enjoin their insurance companies
from denying medical benefits2 17 and for terminated employees seek-
ing reinstatement.2 18 Courts have ignored or failed to consider dam-
ages to defendants and have based the bond waiver on plaintiff's
indigent status, as determined by the court's subjective estimate 21 9
Inconsistent bond waivers and the resulting inequitable treatment of
similarly-situated litigants is best illustrated by the situations in the
ERISA cases discussed infra. The different standards prevailing in
three of the circuits, the Sixth, Third, and Fourth, resulted in district
courts in those circuits setting widely varying bond amounts.
V. The ERISA Cases
A collection of very similar class-action ERISA cases brought in
circuits with different interpretations of Rule 65(c) illustrate the diffi-
culty courts have had in implementing the discretion given to them
under the Rule. Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc.220 and Warner
v. Ryobi Motor Products Corp.221 involved preliminary injunction mo-
tions brought by retired employees of companies that were sold and
reorganized.2 22 As part of each defendant-employer's reorganization,
the companies planned to reduce benefits to their retired employ-
ees.2 2 3 Both cases were brought by a class224 of plaintiffs comprised of
217. See, e.g., Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692, 701
(7th Cir. 1977); Ragucci v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 2:93CV297, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6634, at *8 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 1994); Wilson v. Office of the Civilian Health & Med.
Program of the Uniformed Servs., 866 F. Supp. 903, 910 (E.D. Va. 1994) (waiving bond
based on "permissive language" of Rule 65(c) and plaintiff's lack of resources).
218. See, e.g., Jeffreys v. My Friend's Place, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 639, 649-50 (M.D. Tenn.
1989) (enjoining defendant from discharging when plaintiff argued reason was jury duty,
and waiving bond because of plaintiff's financial condition).
219. But see Von Grabe v. Ziff Davis Publ'g Co., No. 91-Civ-6275, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18478, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1994) (using the plaintiff's request for in forma
pauperis status, and his inability to afford the $1.4 million bond, as factors in denying
injunction).
220. 811 F. Supp. 1025 (D.N.J. 1993).
221. 818 F. Supp. 907 (D.S.C. 1992).
222. Alexander, 811 F. Supp. at 1026-27 (American Can Co., original employer,
merged); Warner, 818 F. Supp. at 908 (Singer Co., Motor Products Division, changed own-
ership through Asset Purchase Agreement).
223. Alexander, 811 F. Supp. at 1026 (reducing rights to medical insurance benefits, life
insurance benefits, and survivor income benefits); Warner, 818 F. Supp. at 908 (modifying
or reducing plaintiffs' lifetime medical insurance benefits and Medicare supplement insur-
ance and requiring them to choose a new plan or forfeit benefits).
224. Alexander, 811 F. Supp. at 1036 (class of "hundreds"); Warner, 818 F. Supp. at 908
(class of 800).
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retirees living on fixed incomes.225 Both defendant-corporations
stood to lose at least half a million dollars if enjoined from implement-
ing the benefits reductions. 226
That is where the similarities of the two cases end. In motions to
set the bond in each of the two cases, one court rigidly set the bond at
over $7 million,22 7 while the other district court diametrically set the
bond at a nominal $250.2- 8 Given the mandatory nature of the Rule,
the lack of guidelines for exceptions, and the split among circuit courts
on the amount of discretion allowed the trial court under the Rule, it
is no surprise that the courts set the bonds at opposite ends of the
spectrum.
The overriding factor in setting the bond in Warner was the
court's recognition of the plaintiffs' precarious financial condition.2 9
The court compared the cost to the two parties but dismissively stated
that
the likelihood of damage to Defendants upon the Preliminary In-junction is minimal. In fact, the only harm alleged by Defendants is
economic.... Clearly, Defendants are in a much better position to
withstand the alleged economic harm than Plaintiffs. This is espe-
cially true when considered with the potentially life threatening con-
sequences to Plaintiffs should injunctive relief be denied33°
The court also based its decision to set the bond at $250 on the "ad-
verse effect on the public interest," viewing the termination of bene-
fits to retirees in the case as something that "would undermine the
integrity of all pension and retirement plans. '231
In sharp contrast, the district court in Alexander followed the
Third Circuit's strict adherence to the "much less discretionary" inter-
pretation of Rule 65(c), requiring that the amount of the bond be
greater than a nominal amount and fully reflect defendant's potential
damages.-32 The district court distinguished the public interest cases,
as defined by the Third Circuit in Temple University, from the ERISA
case before it, by pointing to the absence of any "threat of loss to the
defendant" in Temple University.233 The concern for potential loss to
225. Alexander, 811 F. Supp. at 1032; Warner, 818 F. Supp. at 908.
226. Alexander, 811 F. Supp. at 1033-34 n.16 ($429,640 monthly or $7,733,514 before
the case reached trial on the merits); Warner, 818 F. Supp. at 909 ($495,518 annually).
227. Alexander, 811 F. Supp. at 1038-39 ($7,733,514).
228. Warner, 818 F. Supp. at 909.
229. Id. at 909 (citing plaintiffs' reliance on Social Security income).
230. 1d. at 909 (emphasis added). It is not clear why the court felt "economic harm"
would not be damaging to defendants or why the avoidance of economic harm was not the
precise reason for the bond requirement.
231. Id.
232. Alexander, 811 F. Supp. at 1034 (quoting Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co.,
903 F.2d 186, 210 (3d Cir. 1990)).
233. Id. at 1035.
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the defendant was the overriding principle in determining the bond
amount,234 to the exclusion of all other factors. The court also distin-
guished Temple University, in which the Medicare administrators
could easily recoup payments from the hospital if it had been wrong-
fully enjoined, because the defendant-corporation in Alexander could
not "practically pursue the various class members in hundreds, if not
thousands, of individual lawsuits around the country. '235 Even while
acknowledging the plaintiffs' "claims of indigence" 236 the court
weighed their indigent status against them, finding their indigence
would make it more difficult for the defendant-corporation to recoup
any overpaid benefits from them.237
The Michigan Cases
In a more appropriate analysis of ERISA cases, two different dis-
trict courts set the bond amounts after balancing the equities in a
manner similar to the Crowley test.238 Separate suits were brought
under ERISA against two different corporations in the Eastern and
the Western District courts of Michigan, but the same analysis was
used in setting the bond amount. One of the two defendants,
Teledyne, Inc., was enjoined from modifying health and life insurance
benefits to its retired employees. 239 The second defendant, Kelsey-
Hayes Company, was enjoined from modifying the health benefits to
its retired salaried 240 and union241 employees. The plaintiffs in
Teledyne represented that they would not be able to post more than a
nominal bond, while Teledyne estimated that the cost of reinstating its
old health benefits would be $90,000 per month.242 The court held
that more than a nominal bond was necessary because of the "large
amount of money involved," but set it at $50,000.243
The court deciding the bond amount for the injunctions against
Kelsey-Hayes also set the amount after balancing the harms to each
party.244 First, the court requested that the parties submit briefs on
234. Id. at 1035-36.
235. Id. at 1036.
236. Id. at 1036 n.20.
237. Id. at 1036.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 180-96.
239. Schalk v. Teledyne, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1261, 1262-63, 1269 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
240. Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 857 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
241. Hinckley v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 866 F. Supp. 1034, 1037 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (em-
ployees of division in Jackson, Michigan); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 845 F. Supp. 410
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (employees of divisions in Detroit and Romulus, Michigan; Rockford,
Illinois; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Springfield, Ohio).
242. Teledyne, 751 F. Supp. at 1269.
243. Id.
244. Hinckley, 866 F. Supp. at 1046; Helwig, 857 F. Supp. at 1181; Golden, 845 F. Supp.
at 416-17.
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the amount of the bond that should be required.24 5 Kelsey-Hayes esti-
mated the cost of reinstating the health benefits to the salaried em-
ployees would be $150,000 per month;24 6 to union employees in the
Jackson plant would be $87,000247 and to the union employees in
other plants would be $160,000.24m Kelsey-Hayes requested that two
of the bonds be set at $1 million and the third at $250,000, all of which
the court found to be excessive.2 9 Following the balancing conducted
in setting the injunction against Teledyne and "given the burden
placed on defendant," the court set the bonds above a nominal
amount at $95,000, $100,000, and $55,000.250
Although both district courts reached the appropriate result, their
analyses of the bond amount would have been more clearly supported
if they had used the factors enumerated in the Crowley two-step anal-
ysis. If the courts had used Crowley, they would have specifically
identified and balanced the possible loss to the enjoined party, the
corporate entity, with the hardship imposed on the applicants, the re-
tired employees living on fixed (marginal) incomes. Here, each court
recognized the harm the retirees would face under the "irreparable
injury" prong that is used to determine if the injunction should be
issued. They implicitly balanced the harm to the retirees, otherwise
deprived of necessary health benefits at a medically demanding time
in their lives, with the burden on defendant of continuing to pay the
cost of continuing health benefits of $90,000 to $160,000 per month.
Second, under Crowley, the court would have considered the im-
pact of the bond requirement on the enforcement of the important
federal right the plaintiff sought to enforce. 51 Again, the courts con-
sidered the impact of the bond under one of the four factors used to
justify issuing the injunction. In assessing whether granting the injunc-
tions would be in the public interest, they discussed the policy behind
ERISA,
"to protect the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans ... by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and
obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, ... by providing
for appropriate remedies, sanctions and ready access to the Federal
Court."252
245. Helwig, 857 F. Supp. at 1181.
246. Id.
247. Hinckley, 866 F. Supp. at 1046.
248. Golden, 845 F. Supp. at 416.
249. Hinckley, 866 F. Supp. at 1046; Helwig, 857 F. Supp. at 1181; Golden, 845 F. Supp.
at 437.
250. Hinckley, 866 F. Supp. at 1046; Helwig, 857 F. Supp. at 1181; Golden, 845 F. Supp.
at 437.
251. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
252. See, eg., Teledyne, 751 F. Supp. at 1268 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)).
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Given the directive of ERISA that "access to the Federal Court[s]" be
available for "appropriate remedies," the courts properly allowed a
reduced bond based on the important federal right that would other-
wise be denied if either court had set the bonds at the high amounts
requested by the defendants. The Michigan district courts reached the
proper results by balancing the same factors the Crowley analysis sug-
gests. The Crowley test should be used in similar cases brought by
plaintiffs under a federal statute.
VI. Policies and Solutions
The security required under Rule 65(c) is mandatory because of
the history and the purpose of the Rule. Circuits that held the bond
discretionary initially did so only when they determined that the in-
junction presented no monetary harm to the defendant. While that
exception is still warranted, courts must be clear that lack of material
harm to the defendant is the reason for the waiver, and they must give
defendants an opportunity to present an estimate of harm they believe
the injunction will cause.
To properly assess whether a waiver is warranted in a particular
case, the court should first determine whether the case is commercial
or noncommercial. Commercial cases would be all of those cases in-
volving private litigants as defendants, such as patent or trademark
cases, employer-employee disputes, and those involving insurance
companies, that are not brought under a federal statute specifically
granting judicial review. In commercial cases the primary goal of the
bond is to protect the defendant from financial loss from wrongful
enjoinment. It is inappropriate in these cases for the district court to
balance the equities to both parties of requiring the bond.253 How-
ever, in a case with a large defendant and a small plaintiff, if the court
determines that the plaintiff could ultimately meet damages from
wrongful enjoinment but may only be able to afford a smaller bond, it
may consider allowing the plaintiff to sign an undertaking for the full
amount while setting the bond amount much lower.254
A. Commercial and Noncommercial Cases
Provide Specific Findings on the Bond Amount
At a minimum, Rule 65 requires that every order granting a pre-
liminary injunction or temporary restraining order "be specific in
253. See Frank's GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 103 (3d
Cir. 1988) (vacating injunction because waiver based on balancing of interests in favor of
plaintiff in commercial case).
254. See Continuum Co. v. Incepts, Inc., 873 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir. 1989).
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terms" and "describe in reasonable detail" the conduct being en-
joined2 -5 The specificity required by section (d) of the Rule is for the
protection of defendants and is designed to inform them of the partic-
ular action the court is ordering them to take or refrain from taking.256
Prior to the enactment of Rule 65(d), orders granting injunctions were
sometimes vague, and defendants had difficulty determining what
they had been enjoined from doing.2 7 District courts should be spe-
cific in their determination of injunction bond amounts for the same
reason that they must be specific in the injunction order-to avoid
treating the defendant unfairly. Since the bond's primary purpose is
to protect the defendant, the court should provide the specific findings
supporting the bond amount to reassure the defendant that the court
has carefully considered the damages the defendant may incur if
wrongfully enjoined.258 Vague determinations of bond amounts do
not treat individual litigants fairly and may result in inequitable treat-
ment for similarly-situated defendants in the same courthouse, let
alone defendants in different circuits.
(2) Proposal. Amend Federal Rule 65(d) or 52(a) to Require Findings
The goal of federal courts in setting the bond amount should be
to give both parties notice of how they arrived at the particular
amount. This will also increase judicial efficiency because appellate
courts will have a more complete record to review. Two federal rules
deal particularly with the findings required by a court in issuing the
255. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d). The full text of Rule 65(d) reads:
Form and Scope of Injunction or Restraining Order. Every order granting an
injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance;
shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference
to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is
binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, em-
ployees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation
with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
256. 11A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 2955, at 309. "[A]n ordinary per-
son reading the court's order should be able to ascertain from the document itself exactly
what conduct is proscribed." Id. at 310.
257. 11A WIGrr, MILER & KANE, supra note 2, § 2955, at 309.
258. Without such a determination, the appellate court will have nothing to review and
may remand for more specific findings, as the Sixth Circuit did in CONRAIL. In CON-
RAIL, the district court issued the injunction, and refused to stay its issuance, even though
the plaintiff union failed to post the bond the court had set at $750,000. Division No. 1,
Detroit, Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. CONRAIL, 844 F.2d 1218, 1230 (6th Cir. 1988)
(Ryan, J., dissenting). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit determined that the bond amount was
unnecessarily high and remanded for determination of a lower bond amount. Ida at 1229.
The dissent points out that such a policy allowed the union to obtain an injunction to which
it was not entitled without posting the bond. Id. at 1230. "Thus, the union had its cake and
ate it as well." Id.
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injunction-Rules 52(a) and 65(d). Federal Rule 65(d) addresses the
required form and scope of the order issuing the injunction. 59 Lan-
guage requiring the amount of the bond and the factors used in setting
it could be added to the Rule. A suggested revision of the Rule might
read as follows.
Rule 65(d). Form and Scope of Injunction or Restraining Order.
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall
set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall
describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint
or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is
binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in ac-
tive concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of
the order by personal service or otherwise. The order shall also set
forth the amount of the security required to be provided by the appli-
cant before the restraining order or preliminary injunction shall
issue.260
However, since the specificity requirement in the order issuing
the injunction is designed to protect the defendant, it may be cumber-
some to require the reasoning underlying the bond to be inserted in
that portion of the Rule. An alternative revision could be made to
Rule 52(a), which requires specific findings of fact to be set forth by
the court in its decision and specifically addresses injunctions. The
Rule could be amended to require that the "findings of fact" already
mandated under the Rule also include those findings used to deter-
mine the bond amount. One possible formulation of the Rule might
be as follows:
Rule 52. Findings by the Court; Judgment on Partial Findings.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusion of law thereon ... and in granting or
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth
the findings of fact, including those findings used to determine the
amount of security required, and conclusions of law which constitute
the grounds of its action.261
One circuit court has, on two separate occasions, vacated preliminary
injunctions when the district court failed to either state its findings of
fact under Rule 52(a) or require security under Rule 65(C). 262 Rule
52(a) may be the more appropriate location for a requirement to pro-
vide particular justifications for the bond amount because judges are
259. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
260. Additions italicized.
261- Additions italicized.
262. Chemlawn Servs. Corp. v. GNC Pumps, Inc., 823 F.2d 515, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(reversing preliminary injunction in patent infringement dispute); Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Emulex Corp., 805 F.2d 380, 385 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (same).
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accustomed to providing findings for "all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury" under the Rule.263
(3) Proposal: Require Damage Estimates from Parties
Of the more than 140 decisions setting the security bond under
Rule 65(c) that were reported in the last decade, the bond was waived
or set at a nominal amount one-third of the time.264 Courts that did
require more than a nominal bond set the amount in round figures of
$10,000, $25,000, $50,000, or $100,000 in more than half the deci-
sions.265 The courts' practice of roughly estimating damages in conve-
nient round numbers would not be alarming if there were not so many
bond amounts set without any discussion of how the amount was de-
termined. Since the bond is the only compensation for the defendant
if a court later vacates the injunction, courts should be more deliber-
ate in setting the amount.
Courts will readily admit that they do not have enough informa-
tion to calculate the potential damages, and while some will ask for
it 266 others will attempt to set the bond without the necessary infor-
mation.267 Over the last decade, the high percentage of district court
decisions in which there was no reason given for the bond amount268
263. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
264. Of 142 cases decided since 1985 (excluding decisions by appellate courts or bank-
ruptcy courts), the bond was waived or set at zero or a nominal amount 55 times. Search of
LEXIS, Genfed Library, U.S. Dist. file, for dollar amounts and Rule 65(c) with verification
of individual cases (July 3, 1995).
265. Of 87 cases in which the bond was set above a nominal amount (more than
$1,000): 10 bonds were set at $10,000; 11 bonds were set at $25,000; 14 bonds were set at
$50,000; 10 bonds were set at $100,000; and 42 bonds were set at various amounts from
$6,000 to $5 million. Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. Dist. file, for dollar amounts
and Rule 65(c) with verification of individual cases (July 3, 1995).
266. Se4 e.g., Ireland v. Kansas Dist. of Wesleyan Church, No. 94-4077-DES, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11367, at *24 (D. Kan. July 1, 1994) (giving parties 20 days to negotiate about
amount where issue was not previously addressed).
267. See e.g., Together Dev. Corp. v. Weiss, No. 93-C-2323, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8028, at *11 (N.D. I11. June 10, 1993) (admitting that parties provided no damages informa-
tion but recommending a bond of $1,000); Syntex, Inc. v. Interpharm, Inc., No. 1:92-CV-03-
HTW, 1993 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10761, at *29 n.1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 1993) (setting bond at
$50,000 in absence of information from parties, but allowing motions to alter bond
amount); Gamey Co., Inc. v. Southwest Water Wells, Inc., 92-820-Civ-T-17A, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21319, at *5-6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14,1992) (setting bond at $75,000 even though
neither defendant nor plaintiff addressed the issue in memoranda or in oral argument); see
also Gateway E. Ry. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 35 F.3d 1134, 1135 (7th Cir. 1994) (remanding
for a more definite statement of reasons for bond amount).
268. For a sampling from a variety of circuits see, e.g., Cabral v. Olsten, 843 F. Supp.
701,704 (M.D. Fla. 1994) ($25,000, citing only the plaintiff's "medical history and the likeli-
hood of success on the merits"); Anacomp, Inc. v. Shell Knob Servs., No. 93-Civ.-4003,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223, at *48-49 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1994) ($125,000, "under the cir-
cumstances of the instant case"); Cottman Transmission Sys. Inc. v. Martino, C92-7245,
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indicates that district courts require more guidance in both determin-
ing the amount and identifying the factors to consider in setting the
bond amount.
In all cases involving an injunction bond, courts should require
that an estimate of damages be provided by the defendant, while giv-
ing the plaintiff an opportunity to refute the estimate. The proper ap-
proach would be to instruct the parties to submit briefs on the amount
of the bond that should be required 269 or set a separate hearing to
hear proof on the bond.270 First, the court must figure the appropriate
damage amount based on historical data or projections based on simi-
lar information; certainly on something more than vague assertions. 271
Second, the court must then estimate the time that it will take to reach
a trial on the merits, and it is best if the parties agree that it is a rea-
sonable time frame.272 The resulting damages calculation should pro-
tect the defendant's interests for the estimated length of time it will
take to reach a trial on the merits.
B. Noncommercial Cases
In noncommercial cases, such as those involving the vindication
of constitutional rights or public benefits rights under a federal stat-
ute, waiver may be appropriate. The emphasis in setting the bond in
commercial cases balances protection of the defendant with the harm
that a denial of an injunction, by virtue of the bond requirement, will
cause to the plaintiff. When the injunction will not cause the defend-
ant material harm, as in many constitutional cases, or when the plain-
tiff will be denied judicial review of administrative action, certain
exceptions should be made to the mandatory bond requirement. The
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18221, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 1993) ($25,000); DTH Mgmt.
Group v. Kelso, 844 F. Supp. 251 (E.D.N.C. 1993) ($5,000); Lysaght v. New Jersey, 837 F.
Supp. 646 (D.N.J. 1993) ($15,000); Marigold Foods, Inc. v. Redalen, 834 F. Supp. 1163,
1170 (D. Minn. 1993) ($200,000); Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Allied Old English, Inc., 831 F.
Supp. 123, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ($100,000).
269. Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 857 F. Supp. 1168, 1181 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
270. Ireland v. Kansas Dist. of Wesleyan Church, No. 94-4077-DES, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11367, at *24 (D. Kan. July 1, 1994) (briefing required on issue of bond amount).
271. Gateway E. Ry. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 35 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1994). See also a
good discussion of bond setting factors in Equipment & Sys. for Indus. v. Zevetchin, 864 F.
Supp. 253, 257-58 (D. Mass. 1994), in which the court defines specifically why $800,000
security bond proposed by defendant was excessive, why nominal security by plaintiff was
unpersuasive, and sets the bond at $50,000. See also Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. AMA,
877 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (explaining that $1,750,000 bond proposed by
defendant was excessive, based on "hearsay and conclusory evidence," and setting it at
$100,000).
272. See, e.g., Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, No. C94-4117, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1514, *179 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 27, 1995) (determining that matter could be brought to trial
within one year, and setting bond amount accordingly).
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most effective way to provide guidance to the lower courts in adminis-
tering these exceptions is to clarify Rule 65(c).
Proposal: Amend Rule 65(c)
Rule 65(c) should be amended to fully define the exceptions to
the mandatory security requirement. First, the Rule should clarify the
mandatory nature of the bond requirement by deleting the language
"in such sum as the court deems proper." Second, the Rule should be
clear that it is up to the defendant to provide evidence to the court of
the cost and damages of wrongful enjoinment, particularly if the court
will otherwise waive the bond absent evidence of the likelihood of
harm. Under such a modification, when no evidence of likelihood of
damage is brought forward by the defendant, the court could properly
waive it. A suggested modification might read:
Rule 65. Injunctions.
Security. No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue
except upon the giving of security by the applicant[, in such sum as
the court deems proper,] for the payment of such costs and damages
as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have
been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. The court will determine the
amount of the security after full consideration of the prospective costs
and damages that the enjoined or restrained party may incur, as pro-
vided by such party.273
Rule 65(c) should also be changed to incorporate the acknowl-
edged exceptions for waiving the bond.274 One proposed rule amend-
ment would require all courts to consider the factors already
recognized by many circuits in considering waiver of the bond:
The court may waive or set the bond at a nominal amount only if(1) the order presents no likelihood of harm to the enjoined party;(2) the applicant is found by the court to be indigent; or (3) a fed-
eral statute allows injunctive relief to be granted without a bond.
Additionally, in noncommercial cases, the courts should follow
the two-step analysis framed by the First Circuit in Crowley v. Local
No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving275 and followed by the Third Cir-
cuit in Temple University v. White.276 Under the Crowley analysis, the
court balances the possible loss to the enjoined party against the hard-
ship that the bond imposes on the applicant. Second, the court con-
siders the effect of the bond requirement on the enforcement of the
important federal right the plaintiff seeks to enforce and tries to avoid
restricting the federal right unduly. Under the Crowley analysis, the
273. Suggested deletions in brackets, additions italicized.
274. See supra Part III discussing each exception in full.
275. 679 F.2d 978, 1000 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1984).
276. 941 F.2d 201,219 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Snider v. Temple Univ., 502
U.S. 1032, 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992).
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courts in the ERISA cases discussed above would have required simi-
lar bond amounts, and the similarly-situated plaintiffs and defendants
would have been treated more equitably. One district court, using the
Crowley analysis, appropriately balanced the harms to each party in
waiving the bond and properly set forth the court's findings of fact in
support of the waiver.277
Conclusion
Rule 65(c) is a mandatory rule that requires security to be posted
before any injunction will issue. Despite the mandatory language of
the Rule, at least two circuits consider the rule to be discretionary,
and other circuits remain undecided about the issue. Lack of clear
guidelines in the case law or in the Rule have left the district courts
confused and waiving the bond inconsistently. A few carefully consid-
ered exceptions have been carved out across circuits, but the district
courts have begun to stray from the original, narrow applications and
have extended these exceptions in inappropriate cases. Additionally,
perhaps the most serious and unresolved problem is the number of
lower courts that set or waive the security bond without listing any
reason whatsoever. Inconsistent applications of the exceptions have
resulted in dissimilar treatment for similarly-situated parties.
Despite the differences among the circuits, guidance could be
provided to the district courts through revisions to the Federal Rules.
Language could be added to Rules 65 or 52 requiring the court to
provide specific findings on the bond amount and the factors the court
used in setting the amount. Additionally, Rule 65(c) should be
amended to require that the defendant prove damages anticipated
from wrongful enjoinment.
Courts have been inconsistent in waiving the bond for parties
who, because of inability to afford the bond, would otherwise be de-
nied injunctive relief. Some have granted waiver based solely on such
inability, while others have more properly applied the First Circuit's
analysis in Crowley. Rule 65(c) could be amended to include the ac-
ceptable bases that circuit courts have used for supporting waivers,
and to define the circumstances in which such waivers have been al-
lowed. Without such revisions to the Federal Rules, district courts will
remain confused, and the inequitable treatment of defendants will
continue.
277. McCormack v. Township of Clinton, 872 F. Supp. 1320, 1328 (D.N.J. 1994).
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